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We investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) 
compensation and innovation. In an empirical examination of compensation 
contracts of S&P 400, 500, and 600 firms we find that long-term incentives in the 
form of options are positively related to patents and citations to patents. In 
addition, convexity of options has a positive effect on innovation. We also find no 
relationship between pay for performance sensitivity (PPS) with patents and 
citations to patents while we did discover a positive relationship between these 
and golden parachutes. Finally, we show that subsequent to project failure 
managers’ compensation contracts are reset favourably. We provide support for 
the theory that compensation contracts that offer long-term commitment and 
protection from failure are more suitable for innovation. 
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Minkälainen palkitsemisjärjestelmä kannustaa 
yritysjohtoa innovaatioihin? 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 17/2011 
Bill Francis – Iftekhar Hasan – Zenu Sharma 




Tässä työssä tarkastellaan yritysten operatiivisen johdon palkitsemisjärjestelmien 
ja innovaatioiden välistä vuorovaikutusta. Tutkimuksen empiiristä analyysia var-
ten kerätty aineisto koostuu pörssiyhtiöiden (S&P 400, 500, ja 600) toimitusjohta-
jien palkkasopimuksia koskevista tiedoista. Tutkimustulosten mukaan optiosopi-
muksiin liittyvillä pitkän aikavälin kannusteilla on suotuisa vaikutus patenttien 
määrään ja patenttiviittauksiin. Samoin optioiden hinnan volatiliteettiin liittyvä 
konveksisuus lisää innovaatioita. Toisaalta patenttien määrällä ja patenttiviittauk-
silla ei näyttäisi olevan yhteyttä siihen, miten herkästi toimitusjohtajien palkat 
reagoivat heidän suoriutumiseensa. Kultaiset kädenpuristukset sen sijaan lisäävät 
tulosten mukaan patenttien määrää ja patenttiviittauksia. Tulokset osoittavat, että 
epäonnistuneiden projektien jälkeen johtajien palkkasopimuksia tarkistetaan hei-
dän kannaltaan suotuisasti ja että pitkät palkkasopimukset, jotka sitouttavat 
johtajia ja antavat suojaa epäonnistumisilta, toimivat innovaatioiden kannalta 
hyvin. 
 
Avainsanat: yritysjohtajien palkat, innovaatiota ja kannusteet 
 
JEL-luokittelu: D8, O31  
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Innovation can be crucial for firm  survival. Exploration and development of new products and 
processes help firms to access new markets and sources of value. Innovation, however, is a high-
risk  activity and therefore requ ires  commitment  of a firm ’s  resources  and m anagerial  talent 
(Holmstrom 1989, Aghion and Tirole 1994, Manso 2007) . A risk-averse manager, whose wealth 
is tied to firm-value, may become myopic in outlook and get tempted to invest in projects that 
assure returns in the short ru n instead of investing innovation.  Consequently, for a manager to 
invest in projects with long gest ation periods and high rates of  failure, the shareholders m ust 
provide contracts that create appropriate incentives. 
    Both Holmstrom (1989) and Manso (2007) argu e that to motivate managers to invest in 
the exploration of new ideas rather than exploiting existing ones, in centive contracts should 
assure  a long-term   commitment  and protection fr om  failure. Use of stock options in public 
companies, for example, provides managers with necessary incentives to  invest in innovation 
(Manso  2007). Stock options have a lengthy  expiration  period, which ensures long-term 
commitment, and they create convex pay-offs, which encourage risk-taking behavior. In addition 
to stock options, provisions such as golden parachutes, because they protect m anagers in case of 
involuntary turnover, may also creat e incentives for managers to invest in projects with higher 
failure  rates.  In this pa per  we em pirically  examine  whether there is an association between 
managerial compensation contracts in publicly listed companies and innovation.  
    While  investment  in research and devel opment  (R&D) can be seen as investm ent  in 
innovation, investment in R&D does  not necessarily imply that managers have invested in new  
ideas.  Although CEOs   may  have significant cont rol  over the resources   allocated to R&D 
activities,  investment  of these reso urces  in pr ojects  that ultim ately  lead to new products or 
processes is a crucial aspect of  the innovation process. Patents a nd citations to patents, on the 
other hand, reflect the productivity  of R&D and therefore more re alistically reflect innovation. 
Following Aghion, Reenen and Zingales (2009) we  treat R&D as an input  in the production of 
innovation rather than the output.  8 
 
    In a broad sample of 1,106 firms during 1992–2005 we find that CEO com pensation has 
a positive relationship with innovation. Our meas ures of innovation are the num ber of patents 
filed and citations to patents, which com e from the National Bureau of Econom ic Research 
(NBER) patent data file (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001). We find that standard principal-agent 
contracts  represented by pay for perform ance  sensitivity  (PPS), which  captures  changes in 
managers’ wealth with, changes in firm-value, is unrelated to patents and citations to patents. In 
contrast, our measures of compensation, which enforce long-term commitment, including new 
options grants and previously granted unvested  and vested options, have a positive relationship 
with patents and citations to patents. We also look at golden parachutes arrangements that protect 
the CEO in case of termination and find that they have a positive effect on patents and citations 
to patent. 
    By linking managers’ wealth to the stock pr ice, stock options aff ect managers’ attitude 
towards risk (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Haugen and Senbet 1981). We expect the convexity of 
pay-offs created by options, which incentivize m anagers to assume more risk, to have a positive 
relationship with innovation. Follow ing the literature on options (e.g. Agarwal and Mandelkar 
1987; Coles, Daniel and Naveen 2006) we inv estigate the relationship between sensitivity of 
CEOs’ wealth in options to a unit change in volatility (vega) with innovation and find that the 
vega has a positive relationship with innovation.  
    However, when a large portion of m anagers’ wealth is tied to the stock price, managers 
can make significant gains when the market goes up but simultaneously they can also be exposed 
by downswings. Firms may choose to protect managers from reversals in stock price especially if 
poor firm performance makes outside opportunities more attractive (e.g., Oyer 2004; Bizjak, 
Lemmon and Naveen 2008). Consequently, reward ing managers for good luck and protecting 
them from bad luck, formally known as asymmetric benchmarking of pay, should have a positive 
effect on innovation. We find that asymmetric benchmarking of pay is, in fact, positively related 
to innovation.  
    In order to address the cau sality issue of whether innova tive remunerate managers with 
greater  options or presence of options in m anagers’  compensation  contract  leads  to m ore 
innovation, we look at a sub sample of pharmaceutical companies to see whether firms alter their 
incentive contracts in response  to an exogenous shock. W e treat announcement of a failure of 
Phase III Clinical Trial as a significant setback for firm’s research and development initiatives. 9 
 
We argue that if firms adjust manager’s compensation schemes to absorb such a sh ock it would 
indicate that firms provide incentive contracts th at are more tolerant to failure and hence more 
suitable  for innovation. In sepa rate  regressions of golden pa rachutes,  option repricing, and 
issuance of multiple grants on a dummy variable  that equals one if firm  announced a Phase III 
Clinical Trial Failure, we find positive relationship. 
    Our analysis provides evidence consistent with the theory that contracts that exhibit high 
tolerance for failure m otivate managers to invest in  innovation. High tolerance of failure in a 
manager’s  contract cou ld,  however,  distort  managerial  incentives and   lead to m oral  hazard. 
Holmstrom (1989) argues that  such shirking might get mitigated by increasing the m onitoring 
intensity. To explore the effect of monitoring on innovation we look at the Sarbanes Oxley Act. 
One of the intended consequences of the Sarbanes Oxley Act passed in 2002 was to increase the 
internal  and  external  monitoring  of  firms.  Various  researchers exam ining  the effect of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act have however docum ented a negative effect of the Act on corporate risk 
taking (e.g. Shadab 2008;  Cohen, Dey and Lys 2004; Barger on, Lehn and Zutter 2008). W hen 
we  examine  the effect of the Sarbanes Oxley Act on innovation we also find a negative 
relationship.  
    Our  study contributes to the literature  examining  the relationship between incentive 
contracts  and innovation. W e  know of one   other  study by Lerner and W ulf  (2007) that 
empirically examines this issue. The authors look at compensation arrangements of corporate 
R&D  executives and innovation.   They exam ine  300 US firm s  from  1987–1998 based on a 
survey conducted by Hewitt Associates. In their analysis they find that long-term incentives for 
R&D executives have increased  over time and, long-term incentives are positively associated 
with more heavily cited patents, frequent awards and greater originality. Unlike Lerner and Wulf 
(2007)  who regard innovation as a perform ance  benchmark  for R&D executives we treat 
innovation as a real option for CEOs. By looking  at the relationship between compensation and 
innovation from a CEO’s perspective we gain an in sight as to whether spec ific features of the 
CEOs’  pay package   can  influence  their  investment  behavior.  In ad dition  to  addressing  the 
important  distinction between long and short- term  incentives  and aspects of com pensation 
arrangements that provide protection for managers we also find empirical evidence justifying the 
use of golden parachutes.  10 
 
    In  the next section we describe our hypot hesis  with respect to   vested and unvested 
options and golden parachutes. W e provide an overview of the da ta, a description of variables  
and methodology in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss the results and conclude in Section 5.  
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
2.1. PPS   
In a standard principal-agent model the principal contracts with an agent to exert costly effort to 
affect an uncertain outcom e. As effort is unobservable  the principal in exchange of  the effort 
offers the agent a share in the output. The best  contract that is derive d under these constraints 
seeks to lower the agent’s aversion to risk an d his cost of action. However, Holm strom (1989) 
argues, as the riskiness of the project increases th e agent’s share in the outcome simultaneously 
decreases which induces weaker effort which then requires greater monitoring. As innovation is 
risky, unpredictable, long term, labor-intensive and idiosyncratic, the agent passes up innovative 
projects for less risky ones. Hol mstrom (1989) points out, this trade-off between incentives and 
risk is central to innovation.  
    March (1991) also argues that firms undertake two kinds of activities: one is exploration, 
which  according to the author entails risk -taking,  experimentation,  flexibility,  discovery an d 
innovation.  The other is exploitation, which en tails  refinement,  production, efficiency and 
implementation.  Both of these activities com pete  for allocation of re sources.  The standard 
principal-agent contracts encourage agents to  choose actions whose probability o f failure are 
low. As a result, the agent woul d shift effort from innovative activities to activities that require 
exploitation of current knowledge.  
    Manso  (2007) builds on the tension that  exists  between exploi tation  and exploration 
activities that are available to an agent. The  author combines bandit problems in a principal-
agent framework and explores how  agents constantly choose between e xploration, exploitation 
and shirking. Consistent with the predictions of Holmstrom (1989) the author finds that standard-
principal  agent contracts do not   necessarily create incentives for the agent to   engage in  
exploration.  Standard principa l-agent  contracts  that m otivate  exploitation  instead  resemble 
contracts that motivate the agent to engage in repeated effort. The uniqueness in Manso’s model 
lies in the f act that it allows for the principal to obtain, evaluate and  provide the agent with 
feedback on the project’s performance.  11 
 
   Research  in  the  psychology  literature  also provides som e  insight  into the effect of 
incentives on the agent’s m otivation to innovate. For example, McGraw (1978) and McCullers 
(1978)  argue that pay for perform ance  encourages  exploitative activities in a firm. Amabile 
(1996) argues, that tasks can be  algorithmic (repetitive) or heur istic (inventive). For tasks that  
require  creativity, settin g  up reward system s  can decrease perform ance  because  they m ight 
narrowly focus the agent on a certain goal. An alte rnative explanation for a negativ e impact of 
performance-linked rewards on perf ormance comes from the hidden costs of rewards (Lepper, 
Greene and Nisbett, 1973), corruption effect (Deci, 1975) and cognitive evaluation theory (Deci, 
1975). Most of these theories di scuss the “crowding out  effect” which suggests that there is a 
constant interaction between intrinsic and extrin sic motivation. Extrinsic motivation in the form 
of pay for performance contracts undermines the intrinsic motivation to work.  
    CEOs in large organizations have multiple investment options. By linking managers’ pay 
to firm performance the shareholders can ensure that managers make investments that increase 
firm-value. However, because managers are risk-averse agents they may pass up  risky projects 
for less risky ones. If the share holders want to ensure  that the CEOs maintain their focus on 
innovation, then it is likely that the standard principal-agent contracts may not create appropriate 
incentives. To investigate the relationship between standard contracts and innovation we look at 
the  relationship between CEOs’ PPS and patenti ng  activity at firm -level.  PPS captures the 
change in CEO pay with the change in shareh older return. Jensen and Murphy (1990) document 
a pay for performance relation for CEOs at $3.25 change in CEO pay for a $1,000 in firm-value. 
The authors further note that the change in  CEO wealth is too low and it casts a doubt on the 
validity  of principal-agent contracts. Howeve r,  subsequent studies note that the pay for  
performance relation estimated by Jensen and Murphy (1990) is understated. For example, Hall 
and  Liebman  (1998) report a $14   increase in CEO wealth w ith  an increase of   $1,000 in 
shareholder value and argue that the pay for performance relation is consistent with the principal-
agent models. Therefore, we consider PPS as a pr oxy for a standard principal-agent contract and 
predict a negative association between PPS and innovation. 
 
2.2. Long-term commitment   
Holmstrom (1989) and Manso (2007) further stat e that given the nature of innovation, incentive 
contracts  that encourage innovatio n  must  have a high tolerance  of  failure. If the agent is 12 
 
penalized for first time failures, he is discourag ed from exerting effort on activ ities that have a 
greater probability of fa iling. Similarly, if the agent is rewarded for first tim e success he is 
encouraged  to exploit the sam e  skills rather  than  explore new ideas. Therefore long-term 
contracts that do not promise pay-offs in the short run are more suitable for exploration. Further, 
with long-term contracts, Manso (2007) argues that  despite the risk of agent shirking it rem ains 
less expensive for agents to innovate than to sh irk. To deal with shir king the principal could 
design multiple short-term contracts instead of  one long-term contract. Fudenberg, Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1990) show that in  the presence of public infor mation and re-contracting short-
term contracts can be sufficient. Manso (2007) fu rther shows that in the case of innovation not 
only  can the agent have a different use; he al so  may  have superior infor mation  about the 
project’s rate of success. Consequently, op timal incentive contracts for innovation must provide 
the agent with long-term  commitment and protection from failure. Manso’s m odel, therefore, 
provides a reasonable explanation  and justification for the existence of comm itment, severance 
packages, bankruptcy codes and excessive stock option compensation.  
    Kole (1997) also argues that long-term  contracts encourage managers to stay with the 
firm  and pr events  them from   taking m yopic  decisions.  Therefore, for  those  projects, which 
require specialized knowledge and have long gest ation periods, firms offer long-term contracts 
with  greater restrictions. To ascertain the  relationship  between long-term   commitment  and 
innovation we investigate the effect of new stoc k option grants and previously granted options 
holdings of CEOs. Between the newly granted op tions and previously  granted options, newly 
granted  options have the largest tim e  left befo re  maturity  and should   provide the greatest 
incentive for long-term commitment. The previously granted options are divided into unvested 
and  vested options. Vested opti ons  are those on which the rest rictions  have lifted and the 
managers have an option to exercise them . So between vested and un vested options, unvested 
options have the greater time to maturity and thus provide higher long-term commitment. Chi 
and Johnson (2008) find that incentive effects on fi rm-value are significantly larger for unvested 
options  and they increase with   the length of   the vesting pe riod.  Cai and Vijh (2007) treat 
unvested options as those w ith hard illiquidity restrictions and vested options as soft illiquidity 
restrictions. Following the extan t literature we predict a positive association between options, 
unvested and vested options, which represent long-term commitment and innovation. 13 
 
    Firms  may  also use deferred co mpensation  and stock grants to ensure long-term 
commitment.  However, the in centives  created  by options, stock grants and deferred 
compensation are different and do not necessarily  induce the agent to innovate. F or example, 
Jackson and Lazear (1991), show that deferred compensation is effective only when effort and 
output is observable. Between stock options an d stock grants, stock op tions have convex pay-
offs and therefore create incentives f or the agent to assume more risk. Stock grants on the other 
hand, if the agent has enough of them, have only an incremental effect. Francis and Smith (1995) 
examine the relationship between ownership stak e and innovative activity. In their em pirical 
analysis  of  900 firm s  from  1987–1990 they find th at  overall diffused-h eld  firms  are less 
innovative. However, within a diffusely held fi rm, given the risky nature of innovation, options 
could create more suitable incentives for the agent.  
                     
2.3. Protection from failure   
Threat of turnover is an efficient disciplining mechanism that prevents agents from shirking. The 
principal can fire the agent if the agent fails to produce output. The threat of turnover, however, 
can be detrimental to innovation because innovative projects are characterized by a high risk of  
failure. To examine the effect of the threat of turnover on managerial incentives we examine one 
aspect of the m arket of corporate control – gol den parachutes. Golden parachutes promise the 
executive a handout in case the com pany has a change of control, which as a result provides the 
agent with protection in the event of a termination. The existence of golden parachutes has been 
a topic of constant debate be cause they potentially d istort managers’ incentives. On one hand 
Lambert  and Larcker (1985), Knoeber (1986)  and  Harris (1990) find that because golden 
parachutes provide compensation to m anagers in the event of a likely termination, they align 
managers’ interests with those of shareholders and thus help negotiate better terms in a corporate 
takeover. On the other hand, Daley and Subram aniam (1995), Singh and  Harianto (1989) and 
Wade,  O’Reilly and C handratat  (1990) find that   golden parachutes entr ench  managers from 
disciplining by the market for corporate control. 
    The existing papers that have examined the relationship between the market for corporate 
control  and innovation include studies by A tanssov  (2007) and Sapra, Subram anian  and 
Subramanian (2007). Atanssov (2007) examines the impact of the passage of anti-takeover laws 
on innovation. The author argues  that on one hand the th reat of takeovers disciplines m anagers 14 
 
and forces them to innovate and on the other hand strong extern al pressure makes them myopic 
and as a result stifles innovation. In empirical examination of Compustat firms from 1974–2000, 
the author finds that the passing of the Business Combination Law is assoc iated with lesser 
patents and a lesser number of citations per patent. Thus, weakening of takeover pressure affects 
management in the sense that they follow a quiet life. Sapra, Subram anian and Subramanian 
(2007) on the other hand find a U-shaped relationship between takeover pressure and innovation. 
They measure monitoring intensity using the presence of block-holders and public pension funds 
and  takeover pressure using state-level anti-t akeover  laws and innovation using patents and 
citations per patents.  
    We  specifically focus on golden parachu tes  because they are m ost  pertinent  when 
examining  the im plications  of m anagerial  incentives.  Further in add ition  to  the  market  for 
corporate control perspective, golden parachutes can also be viewed as deferred compensation. 
For example, Brusa, Lee and Shook (2009) find that firms who adopt golden parachutes perform 
significantly better than their peers both in the short as well  as the long run. The authors argue 
that  golden  parachutes  are ef fective  in m itigating  agency  costs ass ociated  with perquisite 
consumption,  under-investment  and shirking. As  protection  from failure   is crucial to the 
innovation process we predict a positive association between golden parachutes and innovation. 
   
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
Our  data com es  from three different sour ces.  The data on compensation com es  from 
ExecuComp. ExecuComp contains information on different components of compensation for top 
executives in S&P 4, 5 and 600 companies. We define CEO as defined by the CEOANN field in 
the ExecuComp database. Our financial information comes from Compustat. For information on 
innovation we get the NBER patent data put together by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001). The 
patent data contains inf ormation about United States (US) patents  granted between 1963 and 
2006. The authors com pile a dataset, which provi des information on forward citations and a 
match with the Compustat database.  
 
3.2. Description of variables 15 
 
Our first dependent variable is  the number of patents applied by  a firm in a given year. Patents 
are not granted immediately after applying and there is generally a two to three year lag between 
applying and granting patents, and som etimes even more. As our sam pling criteria for patent 
count is application year and not  when patents are granted we are less likely  to suffer from the 
truncation problems that may arise from a lag between applying and granting patents.
1 Our next 
dependent variable is a m easure of the quality of innovation, wh ich is calculated as forward 
citations received per patent. Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) discuss several issues that arise 
when  using citations as a m easure  of quality   of innovation. First, the num ber  of citations 
received by a patent is truncated in tim e because we do not observe citations beyond 2006. 
Second, not only do citation intensities vary over tim e, they are also likely to vary over industry 
classes. The authors follow two approaches to  address  the  issues associated  with  measuring 
citation intensity.  
    The first method is called the fixed-effects  approach in which citations per patent are 
adjusted for citations m ade in the sam e year and same industry class.  According to the fixed-
effects method one has to account for the general trend in the market. In effect, all the sources of 
systematic  variation are rem oved  before compar ing  citation intensities of differ ent  patents. 
Another  method,  called the quasi-s tructural  method,  allows for th e  separate identification of 
sources of variation rela ted to time and cohorts. The estim ates for time and cohort effects are 
obtained using non-linear methods. The NBER patent data file includes the corrected measure of 
patents using weights derived from the quasi-structural method. We use citations corrected using 
the quasi-structural method as our measure of the quality of innovation.
2 
    We  examine  various elem ents  of the co mpensation  contract  because  each creates a 
different incentive for m anagers (Smith and Watts 1982). Our m easure of total com pensation 
(TDC1) is obtained from the ExecuCom p database. TDC1 includes salary, bonus, Black and 
Scholes value of options, value of restricted stoc k, long-term incentive plans, and value of other 
perks received. We examine the non-equity and equity-based components of pay separately. The 
non-equity  based com ponent  is a sum of s alary  and bonus. Our m easure  for long-term  
commitment  are equity -based  components  which  are the sum   of the value of options and  
                                                 
1 As part of our robustness checks we also undertake our analysis using patents corrected for truncation bias using 
weights derived from application-grant lag distribution as a dependent variable. 
2 Our findings are also robust to the use of the fixed-effects method used for correcting truncation bias in citations.  16 
 
restricted stock and vested and unvested options  which is the Black and Scholes value of vested 
and unvested options held by CEOs.  
    We use PPS as a proxy for standard princi pal-agent contracts. The pay for perfor mance 
relation has been explored using two main methodologies in the received literature. PPS looks at 
dollar measures of compensation regressed against performance measured in dollars. Pay for 
performance elasticity represents log of compensation compared regressed against rate of return. 
We  follow Jensen and Murphy (1990), Hall  and  Liebman  (1998) and Murphy (1993) and 
examine  the pay for pe rformance  relation  as dollar change in CEOs’   wealth with a $1,000 
change in firm-value. PPS represents the CEOs’  share in value-creation.  We calculate the PPS 
using methods by Palia (2001). PPS, is calculated as follows:  
PPS = SharesOwnd/CSO () + Options/CSO () × Delta [] ×100 { } ,      ( 1 )  
Where, sharesowned is the number of shares granted to the CEO, CSO stands for common shares 
outstanding, options is the number of stock options granted to the CEO and delta represents th e 
change in the value of options held with a unit change in stock price.  
    Our measure for protection from failure is golden parachutes. Data on golden parachutes 
comes from the Investor Responsibility and Rese arch Institute (IRRC). Golden parachutes are a 
dummy variable coded as one if  the CEO has a golden parachut e clause in his co mpensation 
contract and zero otherwise; 59% of patenting firm s had a golden parachute arrangement with 
their CEOs.  
    Various papers have examined the factors that induce innovation  in a firm. Bergemann 
and Hege (2005) develop a theoretical m odel that investigates the financing m odels for firms’ 
projects  that have high uncer tainty.  As th e  uncertainty  increases,  the author s  find  that 
relationship lending becomes restricted and ar m’s length financing, looser. Atanassov, Nanda 
and Seru (2005) empirically investigate financing arrangements of publicly traded US firms from 
1974–2000.  The authors find that firm s  that rely  more  on arm ’s  length financing are m ore 
innovative. The authors argue that  between debt, equity and ar m’s length financing, choice of 
arm’s length financing provides greater discretion to managers resulting in more innovation. We 
therefore include public debt dummy, which is our proxy for arm’s length financing. Public debt 
dummy is a variable coded as on e if the firm  raised funds in  the public debt m arket and zero 
otherwise.  17 
 
    Seru (2007) investigates the impact of conglomerates on innovation. He argues that firms 
with more than one segment tend to produce a lesser amount of, and less novel, innovation. The 
author  further argues that the da rk  side of internal cap ital  market  dominates  and  the b etter 
performing segments end up reallocating resources to poorly performing segments. However, the 
author also finds that conglomerates that do produce more novel innovations have greater market 
valuations. Following Seru (2007) we also in clude  the segment  dummy, which is a dumm y 
variable equal to one if  a firm has more than one business segm ent and zero otherwise as a 
measure of conglomeration in our estimation. The segment data comes from Compustat segment 
data tapes.  
    In addition to the above m entioned control variables, we control for firm  size, firm age, 
industry concentration and firm s’ investment in R&D, the proportion of assets financed with 
equity, Fama-French industry, state and year fixed- effects. For firm size we use a logarithm  of 
sales. Industry concentration is calculated using the Herfindahl  index of assets calculated at a 
two-digit SIC code level and R&D expenses are  standardized by total assets. For firm s that do 
not  report R&D expenses we tr eat  this  as zero and inclu de  a dummy variable called   R&D 
missing. 
    
3.3. Methodology 
Hausman, Hall and Grililiches (1984) develop gene ralizations of poisson m odels to deal with 
patent data, which comes in counts of non-negative numbers. Poisson models, however, assume 
that the mean of the distribution is e qual to the variance. When the standard deviation is much 
larger than the mean, the data is said to be over-dispersed and negative binomial models provide 
a more appropriate fit. In our dataset the m ean of count of patents is  38 whereas the standard 
deviation is 170. Further, the goodne ss-of-fit chi-squared statistic poisson regression rejects the 
null hypothesis that the dependent  variable is poisson distributed at the 1% level. Whenever the 
dependent variable is count da ta we estimate our model using negative binomial regression. 
When the dependent variable is a continuous variab le such as log of pate nts or log of citations 
we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
 
4. Results  
4.1. Summary statistics 18 
 
The descriptive statistics for our sample are presented in Table 1. The firms in our sample filed at 
least one patent during the sample period from 1992–2006. Firms in the 99
th percentile of patents 
filed in our sample made more than 300 patent applications and included well-known companies 
such as: Microsoft, 3M, Micron Technology and S un Microsystems. IBM is the firm that m ade 
the maximum number (4,340) of patent applicat ions in 1999. During the whole sample period 
IBM made as many as 34,360 patent applications. The average number of patent applications in 
our sample of firms during the whole period is 38; however in 50% of our firm-year observations 
the number of patents filed is less than five and in 23% of our firm-year observations the number 
of patents filed was one. The huge variation in  our sample is indicative of over-dispersion. Our 
measure for quality of innovation is  citations which has been corrected for truncatio n bias with 
the weights, estimated using the quasi-structural method, provided in the NBER patent data file. 
The firms in our sample received 617 citations per patent during the whole sample period.  
    The average total compensation received by the CEOs during the sam ple period is $53 
million and options con stitute $36 million. The average salary and bon us is $13 m illion. The 
average of vested and unvested   options held by the CEOs  during the whole period is $110 
million and $50 million, which is much larger than the average compensation received by CEOs 
and is consistent with our argument that elements of CEO pay arrangement that offer a long-term 
commitment, are more typical for innovating firms. The PPS for the firms in our sample is 0.25, 
which implies that CEOs’ compensation increases by $25 for every $1,000 dollar increase in 
firm-value.  
 
(Insert Table 1 around here.) 
 
  Table  1  also shows descriptive statistics of our control variables; 66% of the firms in our 
sample  are divers ified.  The averag e  equity-to-assets  ratio is 49% and  9%  of firm s  made  a 
corporate bond issuance (public debt ). This is consistent with  the arguments of Bergemann and 
Hege (2005) that innovating firm s prefer arm’s length financing. The patenting firm s spent 6% 
of their assets on R&D. Finally,  on average these are large firms with sales in the range of $40 
billion and an average age of 40 years.  
  I n   T a b l e   2   we present the correlation m atrix of our variables of interest. Patents and 
citations to patents have a positive correlation with log of total compensation (TDC1), log of 19 
 
options, log of salary and bonus, log of vested  and unvested options, and log of unvested stock. 
The patents, however, have a negative correla tion with PPS. Both segm ent dummy and public 
debt have a positive correlation with patents an d debt-equity ratio has  a negative correlation. 
Finally  R&D intens ity  is a lso  positively  correlated  to  patents.  The corre lation  between ou r 
measures of innovation and quality of innovation  and various measures of compensation are 
consistent with our hypothesis. Further, both  R&D and public debt have  a positive correlation 
with citations. 
 
(Insert Table 2 around here.) 
 
    We also have growth in capital expenditures as an alternative measure for investment. 
Unlike patents and citations to patents, total compensation, and non-equity based compensation 
are negatively correlated with growth in capital expenditures, options have no correlation with 
capital expenditures growth; vested and unvested options, and PPS have a positive correlation 
with capital expenditures growth. If we consider patents as an investment opportunity with high-
risk and growth in capital expenditure as an investment opportunity with low-risk then the 
opposite relationship between our measures of compensation and the two different types of 
investment opportunities suggests that incentives created by different elements of compensation 
contracts may have an effect on the investment behavior of managers. 
    Not all the firms in the ExecuComp universe of firms apply for patents. Further, firms do 
not apply for patents every year; however, they do more or less invest in capital expenditures. In 
this section we explore whether firms applying for patents are different from those that do not. 
Therefore, we create a dummy variable called patent dummy which equals one if the firm 
applied for a patent in a given year and zero otherwise. Table 3 presents the difference in means 
of various compensation contracts and its elements and firm-level characteristics of patenting 
and non-patenting firms.  
 
(Insert Table 3 around here.) 
 
    The first item in the table is total com pensation (TDC1) and it indicates that CEOs in 
firms that patent receive m uch larger compensation than CEOs in non-patenting firm s and the 
difference is both statistically and econom ically significant. The difference in compensation is 20 
 
consistent across both equity  and non-equity based components of compensation, however, the 
difference in the vested options is the largest. CEOs in patenting firms hold $110 million worth 
of vested and unvested options as opposed to  CEOs in non-patenting firm s who hold half that 
amount ($60 million). Finally, PPS for CEOs in patenting firms ($25) is only two-thirds of CEOs 
in non-patenting firms ($33).  
    Besides there being differences in compensation contracts of CEOs in patenting and non-
patenting  firms,  patenting firm s  invest 6% of   their assets in R&D  as  opposed to the 2% 
investment made by non-patenting firm s. The non-patenting firms also have higher leverage  
ratios (22%) and 4% of non-pate nting firms have arm’s length financing as opposed to 9% of  
patenting firms. The non-patenting firms are relatively less diversified (57%) than the patenting 
firms (66%). Patenting firms are also significantly large in size, which is contrary to the notion of 
smaller firms being more innovative (Holmstrom, 1989). 
    Significant economic and statistically sign ificant differences in both com pensation and 
firm-level characteristics of patenting and non-patenting firms warrant further examination of the 
relationship between managerial incentives and investment behavior particularly with respect to 
innovation. In the next section  we proceed to exam ine the relationship between compensation 
and innovation in a multivariate setting. 
 
4.2. R&D intensity   
Before  we for mally  examine  the relationship   between  compensation  and  patent  applications 
made  by firm s,  we exam ine  the relationshi p  between compensation and R&D. Cohen and 
Levinthal  (1989) argue that firm s’  investment  in R&D not only helps to generate new 
knowledge, it also helps to assim ilate and exploit existing knowledge. The authors treat R&D 
spending as a measure of knowledge generation and accumulation. Hausman, Hall and Griliches 
(1984), however, focus on the relationship betw een R&D spending and patent applications and 
find that R&D expenditures positively correlate with patent applications. However, they also find 
a  negative  trend  in f irms’  propensity  to p atent  and  they  attribute  this to   the  declining 
effectiveness of R&D productivity.  
    In this section we explore the relationship between compensation and R&D expense. Our 
dependent variable is R &D expense divided by total assets. The results for this estimation are 
presented in Table 4. Model 1 represents the  log of total com pensation (TDC1). Our control 21 
 
variables include a dummy variable called segment dummy, for single segment firms, a dummy 
variable  called public debt dummy, for firms  that  issued public de bt,  net fixed assets 
standardized by assets, firm’s equity to assets ra tio, log of firm sales, Herfindahl index of total 
assets calculated by a two-digit SI C code level, a squared term  for Herfindahl index of total 
assets, and log of firm age. In addition we incl ude fixed-effects for year, state and Fama French 
49 industry classifications. The equation is estimated using OLS. The results indicate that a unit 
change in the CEO’s compensation leads to an increase of 0.5% in the R&D expense of the fir m 
suggesting that the relationship between total  compensation and R&D is both econom ically and 
statistically significant. 
 
(Insert Table 4 around here.) 
 
  Models 2–6 look at PPS, log of options, log  of non-equity based compensation, which is 
a sum of sa lary and bonus received, and log of  vested and unvested options received. PPS is 
positively related to R &D expense (1.1%). Both newly granted options (0.6%) and unvested  
options (0.1%) are also positively related to R&D. Segment dummy has a negative relationship 
with  R&D. Public   debt  has a p ositive  relationship  with R&D, which is con sistent  with 
Bergemann  and Hege (2005) and  Atassanov,  Nanda and Seru (2005 ).  Firm  size (sales) and 
market competition (Herfindahl index of assets) have a positive relationship with R&D.  
    Our  findings in this section suggest th at  after controlling various firm -level 
characteristics, compensation has a positive affect on a firm’s R&D. Although all components of 
compensation have a po sitive effect on R&D e xpense, the options exhibit a large r coefficient 
than the non-equity based components. However, it is unclear from the literature how efficiently 
investment in R&D expense translates into actual innovation. Further, R&D expense can also be 
considered as an input rather  than an output variable. Just to  highlight the difference between 
R&D and patents and citation to  patents we segregate th e data into above and below m edian 
compensation received in the form of options  for a given level of R&D. Table 5 shows the  
results for these statistics.  
 
(Insert Table 5 around here.) 
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    On  average, for a given range of R&D,   high options paying firm s  applied  for more  
patents and received m uch higher citations. This  difference in patenting behavior in different 
compensation groups at the same level of R&D suggests that not only does compensation affect 
allocation of resources to R&D but m ore importantly it affects how the R&D resources are  
utilized. As R&D can be considered  a pre-requisite to patenting, we  treat it as an input variable 
and focus on the productivity of R&D in the form of patents and citations to patents.  
 
4.3. Patents 
  Patents are a useful proxy for a firm’s innovativeness because they can convey 
information about a firm’s accumulation of old, and generation of new, knowledge. Patents are 
an indirect measure for capturing innovation. The advantages of using patents as a measure are 
that they are quantifiable and thus measurable. The disadvantages are that not all innovations are 
patented and further patents may differ in their economic impact. Despite being an imperfect 
measure, patents have been widely used to capture innovation at firm-level. Caballero and Jaffe 
(1993) utilize patents and citations to patents as a proxy for new ideas and knowledge spillovers. 
Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) find that both R&D intensity and patents have a significant 
impact on firm-value. The authors further document an increase in market value of a firm by 3% 
with each additional citation. In this section we examine the relationship between compensation 
contracts of CEOs and patent applications made by firms. The dependent variable is the number 
of patents applied for by a firm in a given year. The results for this estimation are presented in 
Table 6.  
 
(Insert Table 6 around here.) 
 
    Model 1 of Table 6 looks at the relationship between log of total compensation (TDC1) 
and count of patents. The results indicate that  the expected increase in  log of count of patents 
with a unit change in log of total compensation is 9%. The test statistic alpha is the logarithm of 
the over-dispersion coefficient. If the alpha coefficient is zero, then poisson regression provides a 
better fit. The associated chi-squared likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that alpha is 
zero. In Model 1, for exam ple, the value of alpha  coefficient is 1.235 indicating that negative 
binomial  is appropriate. Model 2 looks at PPS,   and the coefficient on PPS is negative and 
statistically significant. A unit change in the log of newly granted options  leads to an expected 23 
 
increase of 12.6% in the logarith m of count of patents and a unit  change in log of previously 
granted unvested and vested options leads to an expected increase of 5.2% and 3.3% in the log of 
count of patents. A unit change in the log of non-equity based com ponents of compensation, 
which primarily includes salary and bonus, leads to  an expected increase of 9.6% in the log of  
count of patents.  
    The relationships between count of patents and other control variables are also consistent 
with received literature. Diversification has a negative effect although and an insignificant 
relationship with patents, which is consistent with the findings of Seru (2007). Public debt has a 
positive effect on the expected change in the logarithm of count of patents, which is consistent 
with Bergemann and Hege (2001) and Atassanov, Nanda and Seru (2005). Further, firm size has 
a positive, and firm age a negative, effect on patents. R&D has a positive effect on the count of 
patents (Hausman, Hall and Grililiches 1984).  
    The coefficients estimated from count of patents regression with poisson as the 
underlying distribution (negative binomial if the data is over-dispersed) are comparable to OLS 
with log of count of patents as the dependent variable. The benefit of using poisson formulation 
is that it gives more weight to the largest observations and accounts for large numbers of zeros in 
the patent data. As a result, the coefficients obtained from a poisson formulation are found to 
have more influence on the dependent variable, in our case count of patents, as opposed to the 
ones obtained through OLS. The problem with using poisson is that it imposes a restriction of a 
distribution on the data whose mean is equal to the variance. The alternative to poisson 
formulation if the data is over-dispersed (i.e. variance is much larger than the mean) is negative 
binomial formulation, which provides estimates that are much closer to those obtained from 
OLS. The problem with negative binomial is that it imposes gamma distribution on the 
multiplicative disturbance, which if specified poorly leads to inconsistent estimates (Griliches 
1981). Therefore we estimate our equation using OLS and with the logarithm of count of patents 
as our dependent variable, results for which are presented in Table 7.  
 
(Insert Table7 around here.) 
 
    Model 1 of Table 7 looks at the log of total compensation. Compared to the negative 
binomial regression results, the effect of the ch ange in compensation on the log of count of 
patents is slightly smaller. A unit change in  total compensation leads to a 7.5% increase in the 24 
 
log of count of patents. Sim ilar to the negative binom ial regression results, PPS has a negative 
though insignificant relationship with the log of count of patents. Further, a unit change in log of 
newly granted options leads to a 9.8% increase, log of non- equity compensation leads to a 7.9% 
increase and log of previously granted unvested  options leads to a 3.7% increase in the log of 
count  of patents. The results of OLS estim ates  are com parable  to those obtained from   the 
negative binomial formulation. For the rest of the analysis, to facilitate ease of interpretation, we 
proceed with OLS.
3  
    Our  findings in this section suggest that   after controlling for various fir m-level 
characteristics and factors that have been shown in  the received literature to have an ef fect on 
innovation, managerial incentives do  matter when it comes to patent applications. Consistent 
with our hypothesis, newly granted options, previously granted unvested and vested options that 
promise the executive a long-term  commitment also have a positive relationship with patents. 
Further PPS has no relationship with patent app lications. PPS represents the CEO’s share in 
improvements to firm-value and is proportional to the CE O’s fractional holdings in the firm . 
Although options, salary and bonus i ndividually have a positive effect on patents when we look 
at them from the perspective of their relation with firm performance, the effect is negative which 
indicates that investments that traditionally affect firm-value are different from investments in 
patent  projects. The distinction between trad itional  investment  and i nnovative  investments 
further highlights the need for suitable m anagerial incentives that motivate managers to exert 
effort in one over the other. The findings in this  section are consistent w ith the theories, which 
suggest that standard principal-agent contracts that promote managers to invest in trad itional 
positive net present value (NPV) projec ts do not work f or projects that require managers to 
innovate.  
 
4.4. Citations   
Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) operate under the premise that patents are a proxy for 
inventive output; patents citations, on the other hand represent flow of knowledge. The authors 
                                                 
3 Pakes and Griliches (1980) argue that one of the benefits of using patents as a measure of innovation is that they 
can help distinguish between current and past research investments. They find presence of distributional lag between 
patent applications and R&D expenditures. They further find that even with five years of lagged R&D expenditures 
in the estimation equation, truncation problems may persist. The authors compute a mean lag of 1.6 years for their 
sample of firms. We re-estimate the relationship between compensation and patent applications using three-year 
lagged values of independent variables and our results remain unchanged. 
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further state: “in using citations received by a patent as an indication of that patent’s importance, 
impact or even economic value, the citations that are identified by parties other than the citing 
inventor may well convey valuable information about the size of the technological ‘footprint’ of 
the cited patent.” We therefore use citations to patents as a measure for quality of innovation. As 
mentioned before, citations to patents suffer from truncation problems. To address the truncation 
issues we use corrected measures of patent citations using weights provided by Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (2001) in the dataset available on NBER. The results for citations are presented in 
Table 8. 
 
(Insert Table 8 around here.) 
 
    Model 1 of Table 8 presents OLS regression results of log of total compensation (TDC1) 
on log of citations. The results indicate that a unit change in total compensation leads to a 10.9% 
increase in the log of citations. PPS, has no rela tionship with log of citations and, a unit change 
in  log of newly granted options, non-equity co mpensation,  previously granted unvested and 
vested options leads to a 16.5%, 10.6%, 6.7% and 4% increase in the logarithm of citations.
4 
    Our findings in this section suggest that incentives created by compensation contracts not 
only matter for innovation but also m atter for the quality o f innovation. Further, unvested and 
vested options matter more for the quality of innovation and contemporaneous grants matter less. 
Overall  our findings in this se ction  for vested and unvested op tions  are consistent with our 
hypothesis. 
 
4.5. Golden parachutes   
The use of golden parachutes has risen significantly over time; however, their value implications 
are unclear. On one ha nd, golden parachutes align  interests of managers with shareholders by 
insulating the managers from the takeover market; on the other hand, they could potentially lead 
to  the tran sfer  of wealth from   shareholders  to m anagers.  The purpose of providing golden 
                                                 
4 We re-estimate the relationship between compensation and citations using log of citations corrected for year and 
industry and find consistent results. We also look at the relationship between compensation and citations using three 
year lagged values of independent variables and find that our results do not change.  
In unreported results we also find that a unit increase in the fraction of options in the total compensation mix of the 
CEO has a positive effect, and a unit increase in salary and bonus has a negative effect on both innovation and 
traditional investments.   
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parachutes is to protect managers in the case of termination. Even though the presence of golden 
parachutes can lead to m anagerial entrenchment, they also create room for managers to pursue 
projects  that m ight  have a hi gh  rate of failure. Therefore  we  use the provision of golden 
parachutes in a firm as a proxy for protection from failure and explore their effect on innovation. 
We include G-Index as a measure of corporate governance in our estimation equation.
5 
  
(Insert Table 9 round here.) 
 
  Table  9  presents  regression result s  with golden parachutes as our m ain  independent 
variable. Model 1 examines the relationship between golden parachutes and patents in an OLS 
setting. The dependent variable is  log of count of patents. A un it change in golden parachutes 
leads to a 9% increase in log of count of pa tents. Models 2 and 3 exam ine the relationship 
between golden parachutes and citations and R&D. A unit change in golden parachutes leads to a 
14.1% increase in log of citations and golden parachutes are negatively related to R&D. 
    Our findings in this section support our hypo thesis that golden parachutes m ay be an 
effective  tool for protecting m anagers  against  failure and are thus useful for   promoting 
innovation. From the market for corporate contro l perspective, a positive relationship between 
golden  parachutes and innovation i mplies  that  when  managers do not face the threat of 
termination they may be motivated to pursue pr ojects that may be high-risk but increase firm-
value in the long run. A lthough protection from the threat of turnover ma y potentially entrench 
managers, it creates incentives fo r managers to invest in innovation. In the  long run if the firm 
remains  competitive  due  to new innovative p roducts  and  processes,  it shou ld  also face les s 
takeover  pressure. These findings provide a po ssible  explanation and  justification  for  the 
persistent use of golden parachutes by firms.  
 
4.6. Self-selection 
In analyzing the question of relationship between innovation and incentives we are likely to run 
into self-selection problems. Bound, Griliches, Hall and Jaffee (1982) examine the relationship 
                                                 
5 Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) created an index of shareholder rights of 1,500 US corporations on a scale of 1 
to 24. Companies in the first decile that had a governance score less than 5 were termed as part of the democratic 
portfolio and firms in the last decile that had a governance score greater 14 were termed as part of the dictatorship 
portfolio 27 
 
between R&D and patents. The authors note that a fraction of firms in the Compustat database 
do not report R&D expenditure and further that firms who do report R&D expense are large in 
size. As propensity to report R&D expenditure is associated with firm-level characteristics, it 
could lead to biased estimates. Similarly for our analysis, as we noted in Table 3, there are 
economically significant differences between the firms that file patent applications and firms that 
do not. In addition it is also possible that compensation contracts that we do observe between 
CEOs and patenting firms are a result of a match between a CEO’s skills and risk preference and 
a firm’s requirement for those skills. Therefore, it becomes important to control for biases that 
may arise from any self-selection of compensation contracts of firms that innovate.  
   To  address the self-selection problem in our sample we implem ent the Heckman’s two-
step procedure. In the first stage we predict the probability of a firm filing for a patent. We take 
the entire ExecuComp universe and create a dummy variable that equals one if a firm applied for 
a patent and zero otherwise. Our independent and control variables in the first stage include book 
leverage which is a ratio of total debt and total assets; R&D intensity, which is the ratio of R&D 
expense and total assets; R&D missing dummy which is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
firm has incurred R&D expense and zero otherwise; log age, which is a log of the firm’s age; log 
sales, which is a log of the firm’s net sales; HHI-TA which is the Herfindahl index of total assets 
which is a measure of industry concentration at a two-digit SIC code level.  The results for this 
estimation are reported in Table 10.  
   
(Insert Table 10 around here.) 
   
    Model 1 of Table 10, Panel A, presents the results from the second stage of the two-step 
Heckman procedure and looks at the relationship between the log  of total compensation and log 
of count of patents. The relationship between  log of total com pensation and log of count of 
patents is positive and significant and is consistent with our findings in previous sections. The 
relationships between log of count of patents and our control  variables are also consistent with 
our findings in previous sections and the received literature. In addition, the inverse mills ratio 
(lambda reported in panel A), which captures the private information that distinguishes patenting 
firms from non-patenting firms, is negative and statistically signi ficant, indicating the presence 
of self-selection bias. Panel B, pr esents the results from the first stage of the two-step Heckman 
procedure. R&D intensity, firm age and firm size have a positive effect on the probability that a 28 
 
firm patents. On the other hand, m arket competition has a negative effect on the probability to 
patent. 
    Model 2 of Table 10 examines the relationship between PPS and log of count of patents. 
Consistent with our OLS and negative binom ial regression results the relationship between PPS 
and log of count of patents is negative. A unit in crease in log of newly gr anted options leads to 
an  increase of 9.9% i n  log of count of patent s;  a unit increase in logarithm   of non-equity 
compensation leads to an increase of 8.4% in logarithm of count of patents; a unit increase in log 
of previously granted unvested and vested optio ns leads to an increase of 3.7% and 1.9% in log 
of count of patents; and finally, a unit increase in  golden parachutes is unrelated to log of count 
of patents.  
  
4.7. Sensitivity of options 
In this section we examine the sensitivity of options and innovation and specifically focus on the 
sensitivity of options to price (delta) and volatil ity (vega) of the underlying asset. Option deltas 
represent how sensitive the manager’s pay is to st ock price, and increases in option deltas have 
been  found to induce risk-avers ion  in m anagers,  whereas increasing option vegas arguably 
encourages risk-taking behavior. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) provide empirical evidence of 
a relation between the structure of managerial compensation and investment policy, debt policy, 
and firm-risk. They find that higher sensitivity  of CEO wealth to sto ck volatility (vega) after 
controlling  for levels of risk-aversion (delta )  motivates  managers  to im plement  riskier 
investment and financing options. S imultaneously they find that riskier policy choices lead to a 
compensation structure with a higher vega and lower delta.  
We follow Core and Guay (2002) and calcula te values of deltas and vegas for CEOs’ 
wealth in options. The data for option grants  is available in the ExecuCom p database. Stock 
volatility is a standard deviation of returns calculated ove r 60 months. Dividend yield is the 
company’s average dividend yield ov er the past three years. The ri sk-free rate is the seven-year 
Treasury note rate. We obtain all th is information from ExecuComp. We obtain the year-end 
stock  price data from   Centre  for  Research an d  Security Pri ces  (CRSP). For newly granted 
options  time  to m aturity  is calculated a s  the  difference  between th e  exercise  date  and  the 
respective fiscal year. For previously granted unvested options the time to maturity is assumed to 
be one year less than the tim e to maturity of new option grants. And for previously granted 29 
 
vested options the time to maturity is three years less than that for unvested options. The exercise 
price of previously granted optio ns is calculated as the year end stock p rice minus the average 
realizable profit; where average realizable profit is the extent to which the option is in the money 
(value of grants/number of grants). Option vega  is therefore the sum  of dollar vega for newly 
granted  and previously granted  options.  Similarly,  option delta  is  the  sum  of  dollar  deltas 
previously granted and  newly granted options.  The results for this estimation are reported in 
Table 11. We take logs of delta and vega to obtain a normal distribution. 
   
(Insert Table 11 around here.) 
   
    Columns 1–4 of Table 11 show results for patents, citations and R&D. Consistent with 
the findings of Coles, Daniel a nd Naveen (2006) we find that  an increase in option vega is 
positively associated with patent s applications, citations to pa tents and R&D. As innovation is  
inherently risky, a positive relationship between sensitivity of options and innovation informs us 
of how compensation contracts influence the ri sk-taking behavior of managers. Colum ns 4–6 
examine the effect of vega-to-delta ratio and innovation.  
    The  delta o f  an option   captures  the change   in wealth w ith  a  unit c hange  in p rice. 
Therefore delta primarily captures the sensitivity  of CEOs’ pay to firm -value and an increasing 
delta  makes  managers’  pay m ore  sensitive to  performance  and therefore m ight  induce risk-
aversion,  whereas  vega captures th e  change in   wealth  with a unit change in volatility, and 
induces risk-taking. As options i nduce both incentive effects at th e same time, to evaluate the 
effect of vega for a given level of delta we take  the ratio of vega to delta of the C EOs’ option 
portfolio. Rogers (2008) argues that vega-to-delta  ratio provides a less inaccurate estim ate of 
risk-taking  incentives b ecause  it allows one  to  specify a m odel  for  measuring  risk-taking 
incentives  created by option vega   and value-increasing incentiv es  created by option delta. 
Besides, option delta and vega are highly correlated with each other and having them in the same 
regression model can lead to multi-collinearity. The results indicate that vega-to-delta ratio has a 
positive and significant effect on log of patents and citations to patents, however it is unrelated to 
R&D. A positive relationship between vega-to -delta ratio and innovation  confirms that when 
managers are provided with incentives to take risks, innovation increases.  
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4.8. Capital expenditures growth   
To  examine  the rela tionship  between  CEO compensation   and traditional net pr esent  value 
projects we look at growth in capital expe nditures. Kang, Kumar and Lee (2006) exam ine the 
relationship between managerial incentives and investment spending and find that incentives that 
align managers’ interests with those of shareholders have a positive impact on firms’ long-term 
capital  investments.  Specifically,  the authors investigate the re lationship  between executive  
compensation, which is the sum  of stock options,  restricted stock and stock appreciation rights, 
and long-term capital investments, which is the sum of capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, 
and  acquisitions, deflated by beginning-of-the -year  property, plant, and equipm ent  and 
capitalized R&D. The results for this estimation are presented in Table 12.      
   
(Insert Table 12 around here.) 
 
    Model  1 of   Table 12 presents OLS regres sion  results of log of total com pensation 
(TDC1) on capital expenditures growth. Consiste nt with the findings of Kang, Kumar and Lee 
(2006) we find that total com pensation, non-equity compensation, newly granted options and 
previously  granted unv ested  and vested opti ons  have a positive r elationship  with capital 
expenditures growth. Unlike patents and citations to patents, PPS has a positive relationship with 
increases in capital expenditures growth. The results indicate that a unit increase in PPS leads to 
a 10% increase in the growth of capital expenditures when the number of patents filed is zero.  
    It is worthwhile noting that PPS is unrelate d to patents and citations  to patents and it is 
positively  related  to c apital  expenditures  growth  in pa tenting  firms.  Consistent with th e 
arguments made in the previous section, the fi ndings indicate that compensation incentives do 
affect managers’ investment behavior. Further, standard-principal agent contracts that work well 
for traditional NPV projects may not necessarily work for innovative projects.  
 
4.9. Asymmetric benchmarking 
So far the analysis in this paper has centered on how specific features of compensation contracts 
that  are likely to entrench m anagers  are bett er  suited to innovation. In   particular, we have 
focused on long-term commitment, protection from failure and risk-taking behavior of managers. 31 
 
In this section we focus on asymm etric benchmarking of pay to good and bad fir m performance 
and innovation. 
    Asymmetric benchmarking of pay means th at managers are rewarded for good luck but  
they are not penalized as m uch for bad luck. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Garvey and 
Milbourn (2006) argue that asymm etric benchmarking of pay represents control over the pay-
setting process or skimming.
6 Others argue that asymmetric benchmarking of pay is indicative of 
retention policies adopted by firms (Oyer, 2004; Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen, 2008; Francis et 
al. 2009). The retention explanation suggests that  asymmetric benchmarking of pay can result 
when executives have outside options.  
    To examine the effect of asymmetric benchmarking of pay on firm-value we calculate the 
presence of asymmetric benchmarking for each firm. Following Garvey and Milbourn (2006) we 
first calculate values of luck and skill. Luck is the predicted value derived from the regression of 
industry returns on individual firm  returns, and skil l is the residual. Luckdown is a dummy 
variable that equals one if valu es of luck are negativ e. Badluck is defined as the interaction 
between luck and luckdown. Values for luck, skill and bad luck are obtained by regressing them 
on total compensation for each firm separately. A positive rela tionship between compensation 
and luck and skill means that managers get paid for both luck and skill. A negative coefficient on 
badluck indicates that managers receive less luck-based pay when luck is bad, which means they 
are protected from bad luck. We then create a dummy variable called asymmetric benchmarking 
which is equal to one if the coefficient on the badluck variable is negative and significant. This 
method provides us with one measure of asymmetric benchmarking for each firm over the whole 
sample period. The analysis in this section repr esents asymmetric benchmarking for the entire 
top management team including the CEO. We examine the cross-sectional relationship between 
asymmetric benchmarking and innovation. The results for this estimation are presented in Table 
13.  
 
(Insert Table 13 around here.) 
 
                                                 
6 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) define skimming as CEOs gaining control over the pay-setting process in the 
presence of weak boards and oversights by shareholders, especially in times of good performance.  32 
 
    Models 1–3 of Table 13 show  results f or  the relatio nship  between asymmetr ic 
benchmarking  and log of patents, citations to   patents and R&D. The relationship between 
asymmetric  benchmarking,  which is the dum my  variable  that a firm   provides  protection to 
managers from bad luck and rewards them for good luck is positiv e and significant. A positive 
relationship between asymmetric benchmarking and innovation could, based on the arguments of 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Garvey and  Milbourn (2006), mean that m anagers have 
control over the pay-setting process. Control ove r the pay-setting proce ss is suggestive of a 
CEO’s  prowess in the fir m.  On t he  other ha nd,  a positive relationshi p  between asymm etric 
benchmarking and innovation based on the arguments made by Oyer, 2004, Bizjak, Lemmon and 
Naveen, 2008, and Francis, Hasan and Sharma (2010), would mean that firms are willing to pay 
a premium for retaining human capital. Both explanations point to one key notion, that policies 
possibly  entrench  managers  or pr otect  them f rom  failure  and hav e  a positiv e  effect  on 
innovation. 
 
4.10. Exogenous Shocks – Failure of Phase III Clinical Trials 
Pharmaceutical  companies  spend  millions of d ollars  in drug develop ment  and research. Th e 
process of drug developm ent begins with invest igation biological or chem ical compounds in a 
lab setting, followed by animal trials and then three stages of clinical trials on humans. The phase 
III of clinical trials on hum ans involves a large sample of population and it is during this stag e 
that the safety and efficacy of a drug is tested. The phase III clinical trials are considered to be a 
large investment for pharmaceutical companies. The per person costs for phase III c linical trial 
subjects was estimated at $26000 in a survey report by published by Cutting Edge Information.
7 
  Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich (2007) show that the value of an R&D project to firm can 
be estimated as the drop in stock price subseque nt to the announcement of a Phase III Clinical 
Trial  Failure.  The auth ors  show th at  firms  lose  approximately  $405 m illion  within week of 
announcement of a Phase III Clinical Trial Failure.  
    In this section, we treat announcement of a Phase III Clinical Trial Failure as a significant 
setback for firm’s research and development activities. From the perspective of incentives, if the 
CEO’s compensation schemes are adjusted favorably to absorb such negative shocks, then w e 
                                                 
7 http://www.lifesciencesworld.com/news/view/11080 33 
 
can  argue  that in centive  contracts  that are to lerant  towards failure   are  more  suitable  for 
innovation.  
    The data on Phase III Clinical Trial Failure announcements comes from a Factiva search 
of press releases made by pharmaceutical companies. In our sample of 99 pharmaceutical firms 
(approximately 500 firm-year observations), 27 fi rms announced a total of 55 failures of their  
Phase III Clinical trials during the whole sample period. Pfizer announced failures of 6 phase III 
clinical trials followed by Genetech (5), Br istol-Myers and Squibb (5) and Johnson and Johnson 
(4). During the last 15 years these firms completed approximately 1300 clinical trials.
8 However, 
in most cases results of the study were not published or released.   
    Within  the subset of pharm aceutical  firms  there were significan t  differences in 
compensation contracts of firms that announced failure of their clinical trials and those that did 
not.  For exam ple,  in unreported T-tests between the two groups we found that fir ms  that 
announced failure of their clinical trials paid twice as much in form of options and vested options 
($7500 thousand; $33000 thousand) as opposed to firms that did not announce (($3200 thousand; 
$14000 thousand). Therefore in a subset of pharm aceutical firms in our dataset we exam ine the 
impact of Phase III Clinical Trial Failures on CEO’s compensation schemes. The results for the 
estimation are reported in Table 14. 
 
(Insert Table 14 around here.) 
 
  Model  1 of Table 14 shows the effect of a  Phase  III  Clinical Tr ial  Failure on   the 
probability of having a golden par achute arrangement. As the resu lts show, Phase III Clin ical 
Trial Failure has a positive effect on probability of probability of having a golden parachute.  
    Firms use various mechanisms such as backdoor repricing, resetting the terms of options, 
option backdating, and issuing fres h grants as ways through wh ich underwater options can be 
made valuable to the executives  (Chance, Kum ar, and Todd (2000); Brenner, Sundaram  and 
Yermack (2000); Hall (1999); Hall and Knox (2004); and Heron and Lie (2007)). For example in 
February 1993, Synergen, which wa s in research and developm ent stage, announced the results 
of Phase III clinical tr ials of ANTRIL, a drug for sepsis.  Subsequent to the announcem ent the 
                                                 
8 Data for clinical trials is available on clinicaltrials.gov and data for results on clinical trials is available at 
clinicalstudyresults.com. 34 
 
stock price of the firm dropped significantly. In May 1993, the company cancelled the February 
1993  annual option grant and issued new grants  at  the m arket  value. Model 2 shows the 
relationship  between Phase III Clinical Trial Fa ilure  and repricing. As the results indicate, 
announcement of a Phase III Clinical Trial Failure has a positive effect on the prob ability of a 
repricing decision. 
    Model III looks at the relationship between Phase III Clinical Trial Failure and multiple 
grants received by the CEOs. As an altern ative to repricing firms can also issue f resh grants to 
the managers, in addition to thei r annual grants as a way to rest ore the reduction in wealth as a 
result of a declin ing stock prices. Som e pharmaceutical companies such as Bristol-Myers an d 
Squibb, Eli Lilly, Schering-Plough express ly prohibit repricing of stock options. In stead these 
companies prefer to issue performance-based contracts in form of restricted grants etc. Therefore 
we test whether Phase III Clinical Trial Failures impact issuance of extra grants to the executives 
in order to maintain their pay for performance incentives. Specifically we regress the log of 
number of securities granted during the year on the dummy variable P hase III Clinical Trial 
Failure. We find that Phase III Clinical Trial Failure has a positive effect on the number of extra 
securities received by the CEO during the year. Roughly translated, CEOs receive approximately 
80000 extra options for each failed Phase III Clinical Trial announcement. 
    Since failure of Phase III Clinic al Trial is a significant s etback for a pharm aceutical 
company, evidence that managerial incentives are adjusted to absorb such shocks lends support 
to our initial claim  that incentives prom ote innovation.   Or  more  specifically, compensation 
contracts that are tolerant to failure encourage managers to innovate.  
     
4.11. Sarbanes Oxley 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act was passed in 2002 a nd was intended to im prove the internal and 
external corporate governance environment of firms. For example, the Act increased the role of 
independent  directors in cor porate  governance by m aking  them  liable  in cases of corporate 
misdeeds.  The Act also   mandated  the CEO and th e  chief  financial  officer  (CFO) t o  certify 
financial  statements  and im posed  criminal  and f inancial  liabilities  in the case of   violations. 
Section 404 requires firms to disclose their internal control mechanisms.  
    Several authors have since criticized the Act for intended implications on managers’ risk-
taking behavior. For example Shadab (2008) argues  that as the Act increas es the monitoring of 35 
 
management  by outsiders it prevented them   from  providing greatest value to investors and 
consumers and therefore stifles  innovation. Innovation, as the aut hor argues, is a decentralized 
activity  that requires strategic internal govern ance  that gives m anagers  the flexibility to  
undertake long-term projects and not be m yopic in their investment decisions. Bargeron, Lehn 
and Zutter (2008) com pare US based firm s to United Kingdom (UK) based firms before and 
after the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Th e authors find a decline in various fir m-level 
characteristics such as: board structure, firm-size, R&D and initial public offerings (IPOs) for US 
based firms and they argue that the Sarbanes Oxley Act is negatively associated with risk-taking 
behavior  of US com panies.  Similarly  Cohen,  Dey and Lys (2004) find a decrease in R&D  
expenditures  and capital expenditures in US fi rms,  before and after the Act. W e  therefore 
examine whether the introduction of the Sarbanes  Oxley Act has had an im pact on managerial 
incentives and as a result on innovation. The results for this estimation are presented in Table 15. 
 
(Insert Table 15 around here.) 
 
  Table 15 examines the effect of the Sarban es Oxley Act which is a dummy variable 
which  equals one after 2002 and zero otherw ise.  The Act has a nega tive  and significant 
relationship with innovation.  The negative relationship between  the Sarbanes Oxley Act and 
innovation is consistent with th e arguments made by Shadab (2008), and the empirical findings 
of Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter (2008) and Cohen, De y and Lys (2004) that corporate governance 
structures  that intensify the m onitoring  of ma nagers  can be detrim ental  to innovation. The 
negative impact of the Sarbanes Oxley Act  is more pronounced for the quality o f innovation 
rather than innovation itself. These findings suppor t our initial claim  that policies that provide 
managers with the flexibility of pursuing long-te rm projects and venture into uncharted territory 
are more suitable for innovation.  
    We also present results for interaction  between compensation and Sarbanes Oxley Act  
dummy.  Cohen, Dey and Lys (2004) show that  pay  for perform ance  sensitivity of CEO’ s 
compensation decreased after the passage of Sarbanes Oxley Act. Model 2 of Table 15 presents 
results  for the interaction between Sarbox  dummy  and Log options, Model 3 shows the  
interaction between Sarbox and  option delta and Model 4 shows  results for Sarbox and option 
vega. The coefficient on Sarbox dummy is negative  in most cases whereas the coefficient on the 36 
 
compensation  variables them selves  is pos itive.  The interaction between S arbox  and 
compensation is negative and signif icant in case  of option delta and nega tive and insignificant 
for log options and option vega. B ecause passage of Sarbanes Oxley Act is asso ciated with 
increase in the monitoring intensity of managers, a corresponding increase in option delta in the 




In  this paper we exam ine  the relationship  between  compensation  contracts  and innovation. 
Innovative activities are characterized by high levels of risk and probability of failure. The nature 
of  innovative activities is such  that  the standard principal-ag ent  contracts fail to provide 
appropriate  incentives. Theory suggests that  the  compensation  contracts apt for innovation 
should have two i mportant features: they shoul d provide a long-term commitment to the agent 
and they should provide protection from failure.  
    We find that compensation contracts do effect innovation measured by patents applied for 
and  citations  to paten ts.  When  we  look closely, we find that option s  have a p ositive  and 
significant effect on our measures of innovation. Both unvested and vested options provide long-
term  incentives f or  managers  in v arying  degrees.  We  find  that the y  have a   positive  and 
significant  effect on innovation. We   also find that PPS sensitivity has no relationship wit h 
innovation. Finally golden parachutes, our m easure for protection from failure, have a positive 
effect on innovation.  
    Our results are robust to self-selection biases that might exist between patenting and non-
patenting firms. Further, we show that managerial incentive contracts are crucial to innovation as 
they are both statistically and ec onomically significant even after controlling for a host of firm -
level factors such as: capital structure, govern ance and conglomeration and other variables that 
are known to affect innovation.  
    When we examine the relationship between sensitivity of options and innovation we find 
option vegas, which represent risk -taking by managers, have a positive impact on patents an d 
citations  to  patents.  In  addition  we find that the vega-to-de lta  ratio, which captures the 
relationship  between risk-taking incentiv es  created  by option deltas and value-increasing 37 
 
incentives created by option deltas  have a positiv e relationship with patents and  citations to 
patents and is unrelated to R&D. 
    When we examine the relationship of the compensation contracts with growth in capital 
expenditures we find that, unlike patents and cita tions to patents, PPS has a positive effect on 
capital expenditures growth for non-patenting  firms. Though both unvested and vested options 
have  a pos itive  relationship  with capital exp enditures  growth,  golden  parachutes  have no  
relationship. We provide evidence consistent w ith the theories that the  nature of innovation is 
such that it makes traditional compensation contracts ineffective.  
    We also find that firms that protect their management from bad luck in the stock market 
have  a positiv e  relationship  with innovation. Asymm etric  benchmarking  of pay, which is  
protection from bad luck, could indicate skimming or firms’ retention policies, both of which are 
likely to entrench managers. Further in a subset of pharmaceutical companies we treat their 
announcement of a failure of Phase III Clinical Tr ial as a significant setback for their research  
and development initiative. In separate regress ions of golden parachutes, option repricing, and 
issuance of multiple grants on a dummy variable  that equals one if firm  announced a Phase III 
Clinical Trial Failure, we find positive relationship. 
    Finally, we find that the passing of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, which could stifle innovation 
by restricting managers from pursuing long-term projects, is associated with lesser innovation. 38 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
This  table  reports  the  descriptive  statistics of   key  variables  used  in  analysis  for  the  period  1992–2006.  Patent 
information comes from the NBER patent dataset provided by HJT (2001). Patent is the count of the number of 
patents. Citations corrects for citations per patent using weights derived from citation-lag distribution.
 Compensation 
information comes from ExecuComp. Total compensation (TDC1) includes salary, bonus, value options granted, 
value of restricted stock, long-term incentive plans and other perks. Options are Black and Scholes value of options 
granted in a year. Non-equity is the sum of salary and bonus. Vested options is value of exercisable-unexercised 
options. Unvested options is the value of unexercisable-unexercised options. Public debt is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a firm issued public debt. Segment dummy is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm has 
more than one business segment. Tangible/TA is the ratio of net fixed assets and to tal assets. HHI-Assets is the 
Herfindahl index of industry concentration calculated at a two-digit SIC code level. Firmage is based on data from 
Jay Ritter’s website and the first appearance made by a firm in the CRSP database.  
  Mean  Median  1st  99th  Std Dev  Obs 
      Percentile  Percentile    
Patent  38.01  5.00  1.00  662.00  170.08  6946 
Citation  617.51  40.85  0.00  12166.38  3469.79  6946 
TDC1  5331.59  2446.54  215.00  39130.71  15830.40  6886 
New Options  3577.28  990.93  0.00  33788.08  15363.34  6886 
Non-Equity  1302.29  952.48  57.20  5900  1309.33  6946 
PPS  0.25  0.12  0.006  2.35  0.39  5289 
Previous Vested Options  11090.69  1360.29  0.00  179014.70  50621.34  6945 
Previous Unvested Options  5014.76  452.60  0.00  62602.50  32848.77  6945 
Unvested Stock  1753.88  0.00  0.00  25696.04  12455.72  6945 
G Index  9.52  10.00  3.00  15.00  2.75  4771 
Segment Dummy  0.66  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.47  6946 
Public Debt  0.09  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.28  6946 
Tangible/Assets  0 .26   0 .22  0 .02  0.77   0 .16  6959   
Equity/Assets    0.48   0.47  -0.23  0.91   0 .23      6966  
Book Leverage   0.20  0.19  0.00  0.71  0.16  6924 
R&D/Assets  0.06  0.03  0.00  0.32  0.07  6946 
HHI-Assets  0.11  0.06  0.04  0.55  0.10  6946 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  Table 3 – Difference in Means   
This table reports the t-tests between key variables used in analysis for the period 1992–2006. Patent information 
comes from the NBER patent dataset provided by HJT (2001). Patent dummy is a dummy variable which equals one 
if  a fi rm  applied  for  a  patent  in  a  given  year  and  zero  otherwise.  Compensation  information  comes  from 
ExecuComp. Total compensation (TDC1) includes salary, bonus, value options granted, value of restricted stock, 
long-term incentive plans and other perks. Options are Black and Scholes value of options granted in a year. Non-
equity is the sum of salary and bonus. Vested options is the value of exercisable-unexercised options. Unvested 
options is the value of unexercisable-unexercised options. Public debt is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm 
issued public debt. Segment dummy is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm has more than one 
business segment 
  Patent Dummy = 0  Patent Dummy = 1  Difference  T-Stat 
 TDC1  3317.74  5331.59  -2013.85  -11.32 
New Option  1907.20  3577.28  -1670.08  -9.84 
Non-Equity  1144.16  1302.29  -158.13  -7.44 
PPS  32.10%  25.10%  0.07  8.87 
Previous Vested Options  6322.29  11090.69  -4768.40  -8.18 
Previous Unvested Options  2511.92  5014.76  -2502.84  -6.74 
Segment Dummy  56.49%  65.69%  -0.09  -11.93 
RD/Assets  1.93%  6.02%  -0.04  -44.18 
Public Debt  4.25%  8.78%  -0.05  -11.94 
Total Assets  2433.53  6908.791  -4475.37  -14.18 46 
 
Table 4 – R&D  
The  dependent  variable  is  R&D  expense  divided  by  total  assets.  Compensation  information  comes  from 
ExecuComp. Total compensation (TDC1) includes salary, bonus, value options granted, value of restricted stock, 
long-term incentive plans and other perks. Options are Black and Scholes value of options granted in a year. Non-
equity is the sum of salary and bonus. Vested options is the value of exercisable-unexercised options. Unvested 
options is the value of unexercisable-unexercised options. Public debt is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm 
issued public debt. Segment dummy is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm has more than one 
business segment. Tangible/TA is the ratio of net fixed assets and total assets. HHI-Assets is the Herfindahl index of 
industry concentration calculated at two-digit SIC code level. Firmage is based on data from Jay Ritter’s website and 
the first appearance made by a firm  in CRSP  database. Additional control variables include year, state and Fama 
French  49  Industry  fixed  effects.  Standard  errors  clustered  at  firm  level  are  reported  in  parentheses,  p-value 
0.0001***, 0.001**, 0.01*. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 Log (TDC1)  0.005***         
  [ 0 . 0 0 1 ]         
PPS    0.011*        
   [ 0 . 0 0 5 ]        
Log (New Options)     0 .006***      0 .006*** 
     [ 0.001]      [ 0.001] 
Log (Non-Equity)      0. 003     0. 001 
      [ 0.002]     [ 0.002] 
Log (Previous Unvested Options)      0 .001*     
      [ 0 . 0 0 1 ]     
Log (Previous Vested Options)       0 .001   
       [ 0 . 0 0 1 ]    
Segment Dummy  -0.010***  -0.010**  -0.010**  -0.011***  -0.011**  -0.011***  -0.010** 
  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Tenure  -0.000**  -0.001**  -0.000**  -0.000**  -0.000*  -0.000**  -0.000** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Public Debt Dummy  0.004*  0.004*  0.003  0.004*  0.004*  0.004*  0.003 
  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Tangible/TA  -0.020*  -0.016  -0.011  -0.022*  -0.016  -0.020*  -0.011 
  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.013]  [0.012]  [0.011] 
Equity/TA  -0.025**  -0.015  -0.020*  -0.024*  -0.018  -0.015  -0.020* 
  [0.009]  [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.010] 
Log (Sales)  -0.012***  -0.010***  -0.013***  -0.012***  -0.011***  -0.010***  -0.013*** 
  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
HHI-Assets  0.033  0.022  0.028  0.031  0.054  0.047  0.027 
  [0.036]  [0.036]  [0.035]  [0.034]  [0.039]  [0.036]  [0.035] 
HHI-Assets Squared  -0.031  -0.017  -0.023  -0.029  -0.054  -0.041  -0.023 
  [0.040]  [0.043]  [0.041]  [0.036]  [0.045]  [0.041]  [0.041] 
Log (Firm Age)  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002*  -0.002 
  [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Intercept  0.165***  0.135***  0.125***  0.168***  0.136***  0.141***  0.124*** 
  [0.020]  [0.020]  [0.018]  [0.021]  [0.020]  [0.019]  [0.020] 
Obs  5627  4340  4601  5646  4078  4586  4577 
R-squared  0.525  0.531  0.534  0.524  0.515  0.523  0.535 






Table 5 – Patent Trends 
This table presents the number of patents applied and citation received at every decile of R&D intensity. Hi gh 
represents above median option compensation within the range of R&D intensity and low represents below median 
option compensation. Patent information comes from the NBER patent dataset provided by HJT (2001). Patents is 
count  of  number  of  patents.  Citations  corrects  for  citations  per  patent  using  weights  derived  from  citation-lag 
distribution.
 Compensation information comes from ExecuComp. Options are Black and Scholes value of options 
granted in a year.  
RD/Assets  Options   Patents Applied  Citations Received 
<0,006  High  19  198 
  Low  3  36 
0,06 -0,01  High  11  115 
  Low  5  59 
0,02 -0,03  High  19  191 
  Low  6  79 
0,03 - 0,04  High  29  339 
  Low  12  197 
0,04 - 0,06  High  40  472 
  Low  14  194 
0,06-0,08  High  97  1796 
  Low  43  775 
0,08-0,11  High  57  960 
  Low  20  218 
0,11-0,15  High  88  1379 
  Low  26  440 
>0,15  High  44  746 
  Low  30  611 48 
 
Table 6 – Patents (Negative Binomial) 
Patent information comes from the NBER patent dataset provided by HJT (2001). Patents is the count of number of 
patents. Compensation information comes from ExecuComp. Total compensation (TDC1) includes salary, bonus, 
value options granted, value of restricted stock, long-term incentive plans and other perks. Options are Black and 
Scholes value of options granted in a year. Non -equity is the sum of salary ad bon us. Vested options is value of 
exercisable-unexercised options. Unvested options is the value of unexercisable-unexercised options. Public debt, is 
a dummy variable that equals one if a firm issued public debt. Segment dummy is a dummy variable which is equal 
to one if the firm has more than one business segment. Tangible/TA is the ratio of net fixed assets and total assets. 
HHI-Assets is Herfindahl index of industry concentration calculated at two-digit SIC code level. Firmage is based 
on data from Jay Ritter’s web site and first appearance made by a firm in the CRSP database. Additional control 
variables include year, state and Fam a French 49 Industry fixed ef fects. Standard errors clustered at firm level are 
reported in parentheses, p-value 0.0001***, 0.001**, 0.01*. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 Log (TDC1)  0.090**        
  [0.030]        
PPS    -0.115       
   [0.085]       
Log (New Options)    0.126***     0.121*** 
     [0.025]     [0.026] 
Log (Non-Equity)     0.096*    0.085 
     [0.052]    [0.061] 
Log (Previous Unvested Options)     0.052***    
      [0.014]    
Log (Previous Vested Options)      0.033*   
       [0.015]   
Segment Dummy  -0.057  -0.047  -0.017  -0.073  -0.060  -0.071  -0.027 
  [0.066]  [0.074]  [0.070]  [0.067]  [0.073]  [0.072]  [0.071] 
Tenure  0.001  -0.004  -0.003  0.000  0.002  0.002  -0.003 
  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.006]  [0.006] 
Public Debt Dummy  0.240*  0.244**  0.205*  0.236*  0.290**  0.268**  0.199* 
  [0.100]  [0.091]  [0.087]  [0.100]  [0.109]  [0.103]  [0.087] 
Tangible/TA  0.261  0.350  0.309  0.249  0.539*  0.587*  0.318 
  [0.304]  [0.280]  [0.280]  [0.300]  [0.325]  [0.300]  [0.280] 
Equity/TA  0.308*  0.235  0.242  0.337*  0.067  0.169  0.265 
  [0.173]  [0.197]  [0.192]  [0.172]  [0.197]  [0.195]  [0.190] 
Log (Sales)  0.620***  0.621***  0.585***  0.626***  0.611***  0.621***  0.566*** 
  [0.033]  [0.032]  [0.035]  [0.033]  [0.032]  [0.032]  [0.038] 
R&D/TA  6.547***  6.365***  6.179***  6.533***  6.402***  6.868***  6.145*** 
  [0.798]  [0.811]  [0.819]  [0.788]  [0.810]  [0.736]  [0.815] 
R&D Missing  0.657***  0.705***  0.597***  0.647***  0.698***  0.607***  0.588*** 
  [0.139]  [0.137]  [0.150]  [0.139]  [0.139]  [0.143]  [0.149] 
HHI-Assets  -0.630  -0.152  -0.236  -0.264  -1.387  -0.261  -0.219 
  [1.069]  [1.133]  [1.169]  [1.007]  [1.102]  [1.175]  [1.165] 
HHI-Assets Squared  -0.143  -0.119  -0.027  -0.569  0.875  0.025  -0.042 
  [1.164]  [1.277]  [1.307]  [1.025]  [1.227]  [1.289]  [1.308] 
Log (Firm Age)  -0.035  -0.042  -0.037  -0.040  -0.031  -0.006  -0.039 
  [0.038]  [0.042]  [0.040]  [0.039]  [0.039]  [0.040]  [0.040] 
Intercept  -3.819***  -3.946***  -4.470***  -3.820***  -3.698***  -4.263*** -4.882*** 
  [0.664]  [0.728]  [0.736]  [0.709]  [0.723]  [0.674]  [0.807] 
Obs  5627  4340  4601  5646  4078  4586  4577 
Log Likelihood  -20604  -16167  -17088  -20674  -15189  -17049  -16986 
Alpha  1.235  1.244  1.228  1.237  1.235  1.245  1.226 49 
 
Table 7 – Patents (OLS) 
Patent information comes from the NBER patent dataset provided by HJT (2001). Patents is count of number of 
patents. Compensation information comes from ExecuComp. Total compensation (TDC1) includes salary, bonus, 
value options granted, value of restricted stock, long-term incentive plans and other perks. Options are Black and 
Scholes value of options granted in a year. Non -equity is the sum of salary and bonus. Vested options is value of 
exercisable-unexercised options. Unvested options is value of unexercisable-unexercised options. Public debt, is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a firm issued public debt. Segment dummy is a dummy variable which is equal to 
one if the firm has more than one business segment. Tangible/TA is the ratio of  net fixed assets and total assets. 
HHI-Assets is Herfindahl index of industry concentration calculated at two-digit SIC code level. Firmage is based 
on data from Jay Ritter’s web site and the first appearance made by a firm in CRSP database. Additional control 
variables include year, state and Fam a French 49 Industry fixed ef fects. Standard errors clustered at firm level are 
reported in parentheses, p-value 0.0001***, 0.001**, 0.01*. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 Log (TDC1)  0.075*        
  [0.029]        
PPS    -0.088       
   [0.064]       
Log (New Options)    0.098***     0.092*** 
     [0.022]     [0.023] 
Log (Non-Equity)     0.079*    0.067 
     [0.047]    [0.051] 
Log (Previous Unvested Options)     0.037**    
      [0.014]    
Log (Previous Vested Options)      0.019   
       [0.014]   
Segment Dummy  -0.051  -0.037  -0.011  -0.070  -0.051  -0.055  -0.019 
  [0.057]  [0.065]  [0.063]  [0.056]  [0.067]  [0.065]  [0.064] 
Tenure  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.005  -0.001  -0.002  -0.004 
  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] 
Public Debt Dummy  0.113  0.108  0.097  0.100  0.161  0.115  0.088 
  [0.098]  [0.096]  [0.095]  [0.098]  [0.122]  [0.108]  [0.095] 
Tangible/TA  0.450*  0.506*  0.517*  0.422*  0.648*  0.640*  0.509* 
  [0.257]  [0.261]  [0.257]  [0.254]  [0.296]  [0.273]  [0.258] 
Equity/TA  0.276*  0.229  0.216  0.299*  0.151  0.226  0.226 
  [0.164]  [0.188]  [0.181]  [0.162]  [0.196]  [0.185]  [0.180] 
Log (Sales)  0.401***  0.413***  0.378***  0.409***  0.407***  0.414***  0.362*** 
  [0.036]  [0.031]  [0.035]  [0.035]  [0.035]  [0.033]  [0.037] 
R&D/TA  4.327***  4.361***  4.152***  4.350***  4.489***  4.588***  4.137*** 
  [0.582]  [0.629]  [0.617]  [0.584]  [0.661]  [0.613]  [0.621] 
R&D Missing  0.422***  0.463***  0.409***  0.418***  0.457***  0.389***  0.399*** 
  [0.086]  [0.091]  [0.097]  [0.087]  [0.095]  [0.099]  [0.097] 
HHI-Assets  -1.072  -0.916  -0.922  -0.794  -1.549  -1.353  -0.846 
  [0.920]  [1.095]  [1.111]  [0.863]  [0.984]  [1.023]  [1.102] 
HHI-Assets Squared  0.268  0.157  0.140  0.017  0.898  0.647  -0.002 
  [1.038]  [1.353]  [1.334]  [0.899]  [1.182]  [1.170]  [1.314] 
Log (Firm Age)  -0.008  -0.006  -0.001  -0.014  -0.015  0.009  -0.005 
  [0.033]  [0.038]  [0.036]  [0.034]  [0.038]  [0.038]  [0.036] 
Intercept  -2.170***  -2.448***  -2.693***  -2.232***  -2.343***  -2.490***  -2.971*** 
  [0.447]  [0.435]  [0.445]  [0.476]  [0.484]  [0.475]  [0.502] 
Obs  5627  4340  4601  5646  4078  4586  4577 
F test (New Options+Non Equity=0)            9.69 






Table 8 – Citations 
Patent information comes from the NBER patent dataset provided by HJT (2001). Citations corrects for citations per 
patent using weights derived from citation-lag distribution.
 Compensation information comes from ExecuComp. 
Total  compensation  (TDC1)  includes  salary, bo nus,  value  options  granted,  value  of  restricted  stock,  long-term 
incentive plans and other perks. Options are Black and Scholes value of options granted in a year. Non-equity is the 
sum of salary and bonus. Vested options is the value of exercisable-unexercised options. Unvested options is the 
value of unexercisable-unexercised options. Public debt, is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm issued public 
debt. Segment dummy is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm has more than one business segment. 
Tangible/TA  is  the  ratio  of n et  fixed  assets an d  total  assets. HHI-Assets is Herfind ahl  index  of  industry 
concentration calculated at two-digit SIC code level. Firmage is based on data from Jay Ritter’s website and the first 
appearance made by a firm in CRSP database. Additional control variables include year, state and Fama French 49 
Industry  fixed  effects.  Standard  errors  clustered  at  firm  level  are r eported  in  parentheses,  p-value  0.0001***, 
0.001**, 0.01*. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 Log (TDC1)  0.109*        
  [0.043]        
PPS    -0.010       
   [0.107]       
Log (New Options)    0.165***     0.157*** 
     [0.034]     [0.034] 
Log (Non-Equity)     0.106*    0.089 
     [0.064]    [0.067] 
Log (Previous Unvested Options)     0.067**    
      [0.021]    
Log (Previous Vested Options)      0.040*   
       [0.021]   
Segment Dummy  -0.089  -0.084  -0.038  -0.119  -0.059  -0.073  -0.053 
  [0.089]  [0.100]  [0.098]  [0.088]  [0.104]  [0.099]  [0.098] 
Tenure  -0.007  -0.007  -0.006  -0.008  -0.002  -0.006  -0.007 
  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007] 
Public Debt Dummy  0.144  0.150  0.121  0.123  0.211  0.141  0.107 
  [0.129]  [0.128]  [0.128]  [0.129]  [0.160]  [0.139]  [0.128] 
Tangible/TA  0.119  0.147  0.202  0.082  0.363  0.342  0.182 
  [0.358]  [0.376]  [0.369]  [0.354]  [0.414]  [0.378]  [0.370] 
Equity/TA  0.594*  0.609*  0.541*  0.631**  0.512*  0.603*  0.548* 
  [0.241]  [0.291]  [0.275]  [0.239]  [0.297]  [0.269]  [0.274] 
Log (Sales)  0.470***  0.503***  0.431***  0.485***  0.478***  0.487***  0.411*** 
  [0.045]  [0.041]  [0.046]  [0.044]  [0.046]  [0.042]  [0.049] 
R&D/TA  6.433***  6.114***  5.807***  6.453***  6.632***  6.669***  5.759*** 
  [0.851]  [0.924]  [0.903]  [0.850]  [0.965]  [0.892]  [0.904] 
R&D Missing  0.661***  0.688***  0.591***  0.658***  0.716***  0.580***  0.574*** 
  [0.138]  [0.146]  [0.150]  [0.139]  [0.159]  [0.155]  [0.150] 
HHI-Assets  0.446  1.172  1.127  0.471  -0.105  0.462  1.170 
  [1.364]  [1.604]  [1.629]  [1.273]  [1.439]  [1.485]  [1.622] 
HHI-Assets Squared  -1.432  -2.065  -2.062  -0.950  -0.102  -1.255  -2.018 
  [1.719]  [2.067]  [1.999]  [1.492]  [1.731]  [1.886]  [1.993] 
Log (Firm Age)  -0.000  0.002  0.014  -0.006  0.010  0.025  0.007 
  [0.050]  [0.055]  [0.054]  [0.050]  [0.055]  [0.054]  [0.054] 
Intercept  -1.281*  -1.077  -1.419*  -1.327*  -1.777**  -1.634*  -1.779* 
  [0.609]  [0.698]  [0.706]  [0.641]  [0.657]  [0.638]  [0.771] 
Obs  5627  4340  4601  5646  4078  4586  4577 
R-Squared  0.446  0.440  0.448  0.446  0.460  0.460  0.449 




Table 9 – Golden Parachutes 
Patent information comes from the NBER patent dataset provided by HJT (2001). Patents is count of number of 
patents. Citations corrects for citations per patent using weights derived from citation-lag distribution.
 Data on 
golden parachutes and G-Index comes from the IRRC. Public debt is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm 
issued public debt. Segment dummy is a  dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm has more than one 
business segment. Tangible/TA is the ratio of net fixed assets and total assets. HHI-Assets is the Herfindahl index 
of industry concentration calculated at a t wo-digit SIC code level. Firmage is based on data from Jay Ritter’s 
website and the first appearance made by a firm in the CRSP database. Additional control variables include year, 
state and Fama French 49 Industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, p-value 
0.0001***, 0.001**, 0.01*. 
  Log Patent  Log Citation  R&D/Assets 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Golden Parachute  0.090*  0.141*  -0.004* 
  [0.051]  [0.078]  [0.002] 
G Index  -0.045***  -0.068***  -0.002*** 
  [0.010]  [0.015]  [0.000] 
Segment Dummy  -0.162***  -0.290***  -0.019*** 
  [0.049]  [0.078]  [0.002] 
Tenure  0.081  0.025  0.004* 
  [0.089]  [0.125]  [0.002] 
Public Debt Dummy  0.613***  0.454*  -0.032*** 
  [0.174]  [0.264]  [0.007] 
Tangible/TA  0.182  0.353*  0.005 
  [0.118]  [0.177]  [0.007] 
Equity/TA  0.515***  0.617***  -0.008*** 
  [0.021]  [0.030]  [0.001] 
Log (Sales)  4.859***  6.005***   
  [0.468]  [0.708]   
R&D/TA  0.499***  0.687***   
  [0.059]  [0.105]   
HHI-Assets  1.419  4.110*  0.042 
  [1.382]  [1.873]  [0.041] 
HHI-Assets Squared  -2.070  -4.259  -0.032 
  [2.407]  [2.931]  [0.042] 
Log (Firm Age)  0.038  0.014  -0.005*** 
  [0.032]  [0.050]  [0.001] 
Intercept  -2.292***  -0.877*  0.176*** 
  [0.316]  [0.456]  [0.013] 
Obs  3758  3758  3758   














Table 10 – Self-selection 
This table present results for the two-stage Heckman procedure. Patent information comes from the NBER patent 
dataset provided by HJT (2001). Patents are the count of the number of patents. Compensation information comes 
from ExecuComp. Total compensation (TDC1) includes salary, bonus, value options granted, value of restricted 
stock, long-term incentive plans and other perks. Options are Black and Scholes value of options granted in a year. 
Non-equity is the sum of salary and bonus. Unvested options is the value of unexercisable-unexercised options. 
Public debt is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm issued public debt. Segment dummy is a dummy variable 
which is equal to one if the firm has more than one business segment. Tangible/TA is the ratio of net fixed assets 
and total assets. HHI-Assets  is the Herfindahl index of industry concentration calculated at a two-digit SIC code 
level. Firmage is based on data from Jay Ritter’s website and the first appearance made by a firm in the CRSP 
database. Additional control variables include year, state and Fama French 49 Industry fixed effects. The dependent 
variable for first stage is patent dummy, which is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm in the ExecuComp 
universe filed for a patent in a given year and zero otherwise. Robust Standard errors are reported in parentheses, p-
value 0.0001***, 0.001**, 0.01*. 
Panel: 2
nd Stage  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Log (TDC1)  0.081***         
  [0.019]         
PPS    -0.089        
   [0.058]        
Log (New Options)    0.099***      0.093*** 
     [0.017]      [0.018] 
Log (Non-Equity)      0.084**      0.066* 
     [0.029]     [0.036] 
Log (Previous Unvested Options)      0.037***     
      [0.011]     
Log (Previous Vested Options)        0.019*    
       [0.010]    
Golden Parachute         0.064   
        [0.055]   
G Index        -0.019*   
        [0.010]   
Segment Dummy  -0.05  -0.055  -0.011  -0.068*  -0.05  -0.054  -0.130*  -0.018 
  [0.040]  [0.047]  [0.045]  [0.040]  [0.047]  [0.045]  [0.057]  [0.045] 
Tenure  -0.004*  -0.004  -0.004  -0.005*  -0.001  -0.002  -0.004  -0.004 
  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Public Debt Dummy 0.110*  0.1  0.093  0.098*  0.159*  0.111*  0.082  0.084 
  [0.059]  [0.067]  [0.064]  [0.059]  [0.072]  [0.065]  [0.074]  [0.064] 
Tangible/Assets  0.433***  0.497**  0.499***  0.401**  0.626***  0.617***  0.265  0.491*** 
  [0.131]  [0.158]  [0.148]  [0.130]  [0.161]  [0.149]  [0.191]  [0.148] 
Equity/Assets  0.271**  0.282**  0.235*  0.294***  0.155  0.245*  0.178  0.244* 
  [0.083]  [0.103]  [0.098]  [0.083]  [0.106]  [0.101]  [0.131]  [0.099] 
Log (Sales)  0.360***  0.370***  0.339***  0.369***  0.364***  0.379***  0.432***  0.325*** 
  [0.016]  [0.019]  [0.019]  [0.017]  [0.019]  [0.018]  [0.025]  [0.021] 
R&D/Assets  3.803***  3.642***  3.628***  3.834***  3.908***  4.107***  4.534***  3.632*** 
  [0.364]  [0.433]  [0.411]  [0.363]  [0.446]  [0.416]  [0.569]  [0.411] 
HHI-Assets  -1.025*  -1.487*  -0.742  -0.773  -1.375*  -1.196*  0.452  -0.664 
  [0.596]  [0.756]  [0.674]  [0.572]  [0.714]  [0.669]  [0.873]  [0.675] 
HHI-Assets Squared 0.337  1.545  0.097  0.077  0.821  0.59  -1.492  -0.048 
  [0.846]  [1.195]  [0.965]  [0.766]  [0.992]  [0.937]  [1.306]  [0.970] 
Log (Age)  -0.006  0.001  0.003  -0.012  -0.008  0.013  0.135**  -0.001 
  [0.020]  [0.024]  [0.023]  [0.020]  [0.024]  [0.023]  [0.042]  [0.023] 
Lambda  -0.318***  -0.334***  -0.294***  -0.314***  -0.311***  -0.272***  -0.283***-0.284*** 
  [0.058]  [0.070]  [0.064]  [0.058]  [0.071]  [0.065]  [0.082]  [0.064] 
Intercept  -1.187**  -1.182*  -1.625**  -1.247**  -1.191*  -1.367**  -1.594**-1.939*** 
  [0.396]  [0.569]  [0.531]  [0.404]  [0.538]  [0.503]  [0.549]  [0.558] 53 
 
 
Continued from Table 10         
          
Panel B: 1
st Stage  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Log (Sales)  0.228***  0.249***  0.250***  0.228***  0.246***  0.245***  0.304***  0.251*** 
  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.011]  [0.009] 
R&D/Assets  3.430***  3.902***  3.732***  3.428***  3.756***  3.622***  3.272***  3.739*** 
  [0.239]  [0.255]  [0.251]  [0.239]  [0.259]  [0.252]  [0.305]  [0.252] 
HHI-Assets  -0.818***  -0.966***  -0.940***  -0.774***  -0.788***  -0.864***  -1.214***-0.960*** 
  [0.120]  [0.142]  [0.133]  [0.119]  [0.134]  [0.131]  [0.162]  [0.134] 
Log (Age)  -0.018  -0.035*  -0.029*  -0.018  -0.038*  -0.027*  -0.426***  -0.029* 
  [0.015]  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.015]  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.018]  [0.016] 
Book Leverage  0  0.098  0.098  -0.011  -0.043  0.01  0.079  0.093 
  [0.072]  [0.080]  [0.078]  [0.072]  [0.081]  [0.078]  [0.092]  [0.078] 
R&D Missing  1.483***  1.518***  1.508***  1.488***  1.509***  1.518***  1.476***  1.510*** 
  [0.030]  [0.033]  [0.032]  [0.029]  [0.033]  [0.032]  [0.037]  [0.032] 
Intercept  -2.736***  -3.071***  -3.022***  -2.740***  -3.024***  -2.987***  -2.269***-3.033*** 
  [0.093]  [0.102]  [0.099]  [0.093]  [0.102]  [0.099]  [0.110]  [0.099] 
Obs  14671  13232  13653  14689  13133  13637  12236  13629 
Chi-S  2545  2036  2277  2523  2011  2248  2699  2269 




































Table 11– Sensitivity of Options 
Patent information comes from the NBER patent dataset provided by HJT (2001). Patents is the count of the number 
of  patents.  Citations  corrects  for  citations  per  patent  using  weights  derived  from  citation-lag  distribution.
 
Compensation information comes from ExecuComp. Options delta is change in the value of options with a un it 
change in price. Options vega is change in the value of options with a unit change in volatility. Public debt is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a firm issued public debt. Segment dummy is a dummy variable which is equal to 
one if the firm has more than one business segment. Tangible/TA is the ratio of  net fixed assets and total assets. 
HHI-Assets is the Herfindahl index of industry concentration calculated at a two-digit SIC code level. Firmage is 
based on data from Jay Ritter’s website and the first appearance made by a firm in the CRSP database. Additional 
control variables include year, state and Fama French 49 Industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at firm 
level are reported in parentheses, p-value 0.0001***, 0.001**, 0.01*. 
  Log Patents  Log Citations  R&D/Assets  Log Patents  Log Citations  R&D/Assets 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Wealth Vega  0.175***  0.254***  0.004**       
  [0.028]  [0.041]  [0.001]       
Wealth Vega/Wealth Delta      0.416*  0.482*  -0.009 
        [0.206]  [0.288]  [0.007] 
Segment Dummy  -0.022  -0.054  -0.009**  -0.048  -0.094  -0.010** 
  [0.070]  [0.107]  [0.003]  [0.069]  [0.107]  [0.003] 
Tenure  -0.005  -0.009  -0.001**  -0.003  -0.006  -0.001* 
  [0.005]  [0.007]  [0.000]  [0.005]  [0.007]  [0.000] 
Public Debt Dummy  0.013  0.023  0.005*  0.030  0.050  0.006* 
  [0.101]  [0.135]  [0.003]  [0.100]  [0.134]  [0.003] 
Tangible/TA  0.541*  0.184  -0.012  0.427  0.021  -0.015 
  [0.264]  [0.392]  [0.012]  [0.270]  [0.399]  [0.012] 
Equity/TA  0.123  0.408  -0.018*  0.192  0.513*  -0.016 
  [0.198]  [0.298]  [0.011]  [0.203]  [0.307]  [0.011] 
Log (Sales)  0.330***  0.376***  -0.013***  0.403***  0.488***  -0.011*** 
  [0.037]  [0.048]  [0.002]  [0.034]  [0.045]  [0.002] 
R&D/TA  4.289***  6.081***    4.548***  6.448***   
  [0.635]  [0.927]    [0.646]  [0.943]   
R&D Missing  0.453***  0.655***    0.466***  0.674***   
  [0.096]  [0.160]    [0.098]  [0.161]   
HHI-Assets  -1.024  1.275  0.028  -1.085  1.190  0.028 
  [1.146]  [1.683]  [0.038]  [1.148]  [1.681]  [0.038] 
HHI-Assets Squared  0.508  -1.497  -0.025  0.561  -1.437  -0.026 
  [1.484]  [2.137]  [0.044]  [1.504]  [2.168]  [0.045] 
Log (Firm Age)  0.000  0.006  -0.002  -0.010  -0.006  -0.003 
  [0.038]  [0.056]  [0.002]  [0.039]  [0.058]  [0.002] 
Intercept  -2.479***  -1.142  0.146***  -2.473***  -1.146  0.145*** 
  [0.463]  [0.756]  [0.019]  [0.454]  [0.738]  [0.019] 
Obs  3924  3924  3924  3924  3924  3924 















Table 12 – Capital Expenditures Growth 
The dependent variable is one year future growth in capital expenditures. Capex growth is calculated as (capext+1-
capext0 )/capext0.
 Compensation information comes from ExecuComp. Total compensation (TDC1) includes salary, 
bonus, value options granted, value of restricted stock, long-term incentive plans and other perks. Options are 
Black and Scholes value of options granted in a year. Non-equity is the sum of salary and bonus. PPS is pay for 
performance sensitivity. Segment dummy is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm has more than one 
business segment. Tangible/TA is the ratio of net fixed assets and total assets. HHI-Assets is the Herfindahl index 
of industry concentration calculated at a t wo-digit SIC code level. Firmage is based on data from Jay Ritter’s 
website and the first appearance made by a firm in the CRSP database. Additional control variables include year, 
state and Fama French 49 Industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses, 
p-value 0.0001***, 0.001**, 0.01*. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Log(TDC1)  0.059***         
  [0.014]         
PPS    0.107*       
    [0.050]       
Options/TDC1     0 .065*     
     [ 0.038]     
(Salary+Bonus)/TDC1       -0.041   
       [0.042]   
Golden Parachute         -0.041* 
      [ 0 . 0 2 1 ]  
Segment Dummy  -0.072**  -0.065*  -0.077**  -0.079**  -0.076** 
  [0.024]  [0.027]  [0.024]  [0.024]  [0.027] 
Tenure  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Public Debt Dummy  -0.008  -0.003  -0.004  -0.003  -0.020 
  [0.020]  [0.021]  [0.020]  [0.020]  [0.021] 
Tangible/TA  -0.591***  -0.646***  -0.614***  -0.616***  -0.348*** 
  [0.076]  [0.090]  [0.077]  [0.077]  [0.089] 
Equity/TA  0.109*  0.182*  0.120*  0.125*  -0.004 
  [0.061]  [0.075]  [0.061]  [0.061]  [0.073] 
Log (Sales)  -0.059***  -0.018*  -0.037***  -0.036***  -0.027** 
  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.009] 
R&D/TA  -0.546*  -0.422  -0.504*  -0.489*  -0.547* 
  [0.240]  [0.269]  [0.242]  [0.242]  [0.275] 
R&D Missing  0.027  -0.016  0.033  0.034  0.050 
  [0.031]  [0.040]  [0.030]  [0.031]  [0.036] 
HHI-Assets  -0.074  -0.067  -0.075  -0.064  -0.163 
  [0.286]  [0.322]  [0.289]  [0.288]  [0.269] 
HHI-Assets Squared  0.200  0.292  0.192  0.187  0.118 
  [0.395]  [0.575]  [0.400]  [0.397]  [0.466] 
Log (Firm Age)  0.013  0.014  0.013  0.013  -0.004 
  [0.011]  [0.012]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.013] 
Intercept  0.108  0.019  0.305*  0.337*  0.301* 
  [0.164]  [0.265]  [0.159]  [0.167]  [0.177] 
Obs  5323  3956  5323  5323  3463 









Table 13 – Asymmetric Benchmarking 
Patent information comes from the NBER patent dataset provided by HJT (2001). Patents is the count of the number 
of  patents.  Citations  corrects  for  citations  per  patent  using  weights  derived  from  citation-lag  distribution.
 
Compensation information comes from ExecuComp. Options are Black and Scholes value of options granted in a 
year. Asymmetric benchmark is a dummy variable that equals one if there is asymmetric benchmarking of pay and 
zero otherwise. HHI-Assets is the Herfindahl index of industry concentration calculated at a two-digit SIC code 
level. Firmage is based on data from Jay Ritter’s website and the first appearance made by a firm in CRSP database. 
Additional control variables include year, state and industry fixed effects at two-digit SIC code level. Standard 
errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses, p-value 0.0001***, 0.001**, 0.01*. 
  Log Patents  Log Citations  R&D/Assets 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Asymmetric Benchmarking  0.076*  0.194**  0.004* 
  [0.045]  [0.069]  [0.002] 
Book Leverage  -0.038  -0.054  -0.023*** 
  [0.145]  [0.221]  [0.006] 
Log(Sales)  0.423***  0.486***  -0.012*** 
  [0.015]  [0.022]  [0.001] 
R&D/TA  4.744***  6.992***   
  [0.455]  [0.693]   
R&D Missing  0.489***  0.752***   
  [0.082]  [0.125]   
HHI-Assets  -0.898*  -0.377  0.043** 
  [0.398]  [0.608]  [0.015] 
Log (Firm Age)  0.002  0.013  -0.001 
  [0.028]  [0.043]  [0.001] 
Intercept  -1.194***  0.309  0.144*** 
  [0.229]  [0.350]  [0.008] 
Obs  3499  3499  3499 


















Table 14 –Exogenous Shocks – Failure of Phase III Clinical Trials 
This table presents the regression results for subsample of pharmaceutical firms (SIC=2834). Data on Phase III 
Clinical Trial Failures comes from Factiva. Golden parachute is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if CEO had a 
golden  parachute  arrangement  with  the  company.  Information  on  golden  parachutes  comes  from  IRRC. 
Compensation information comes from ExecuComp. Repricing is a dummy variable, which equals one if the CEO 
was enlisted in the repricing Table. Option grants is the log of number of grants the CEO received in the middle of 
the year. Book leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Tobin’s Q is total debt plus market value of equity 
divided  by  total  assets.  Financial  and  accounting  information  is  obtained  from  Compustat.  Additional  control 
variables  include  year.  Standard  errors  clustered  at  firm  level  are  reported  in  parentheses,  p-value  0.0001***, 
0.001**, 0.01* 
  Golden Parachute  Repricing  Option Grants (#) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Clinical Trial Phase III Failure  0.601**  0.881*  0.732* 
  [0.226]  [0.531]  [0.425] 
Log Sales  -0.093  -0.110*  0.129* 
  [0.079]  [0.058]  [0.068] 
Book Leverage  0.236  -1.159  -0.836 
  [0.962]  [1.681]  [1.041] 
Tobin's Q  -0.009  0.025  0.064 
  [0.067]  [0.131]  [0.075] 
Intercept  1.018  -5.877  3.740*** 
  [0.770]  [0.000]  [1.053] 
Observations  281  193  81 
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